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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis consists of three essays on the Economics of Crime in Mexico covering the period 
1997-2010. The aim of this introductory section is to briefly provide a non-technical overview of 
the essays. The discussion of the contribution of this work to the existing literature will be 
carried out separately in each essay. 
Even though crime has for a long time been a present threat for the Mexican economy and 
society, this research project was motivated by the public security problem being faced by the 
Mexican Federal Government and the Mexican population during the last six years. It has been 
widely reported that in December 2006 the Mexican federal government deployed the military to 
the Mexican north border to the United States in an effort to directly combat the drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs) operating especially in that part of the country. From that year onwards 
Mexico has experienced a dramatic and unprecedented increase in the levels of violence. This 
violence erupted in three forms: DTOs fighting each other for the control of the drug routes to 
the United States, the military and police forces fighting against the DTOs and the violence 
experienced by the population in forms of extortion, kidnapping & homicide by the DTOs and 
civilian population´s deaths due to the crossed fire among DTOs, the military and /or police 
forces (Ríos 2012, Dean 2012).  
The thesis looks at the influence of this phenomenon on three important aspects of Mexico: 
The tourism industry, the threat of organized crime towards the Mexican youth and the spread of 
drug crime throughout the country.  
The increasing violence in Mexico starting in 2006 went quickly reported around the world. 
Several countries started issuing travel warnings to visit the country. For instance the Australian 
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government made its alert public through its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 
“Travellers may become victims of violence directed against others”.1 Accordingly, the Mexican 
Senate urged the Mexican Federal Executive to provide fiscal incentives to the tourism industry 
as a way to palliate the negative impact on tourism due to the fight against DTOs. At the same 
time the Mexican Senate called on the Ministry of Tourism to intensify the promotion of Mexico 
abroad as a secure tourism destination.
2
   
After petroleum sales, and remittances, tourism is an important source of income for the 
Mexican economy. As of now there is no empirical investigation of the impact that crime has on 
tourism across Mexico. Thus, the first chapter deals with the question whether violent crime 
exerts any effect on tourism in Mexico during the period 1997-2010 by implementing unique 
disaggregated data of tourist arrivals at the sub-national level. According to Neumayer (2004) 
one of the limitations in the economics of tourism literature is the availability of tourist arrivals 
data at the sub-national level. The paper uses homicides as a proxy for violent crime and uses a 
panel data set for the 31 Mexican federal states and Mexico City. After dealing and discussing 
the potential endogeneity in the relationship violent crime–tourism the results suggest a negative 
and significant effect of homicides on the number of tourists arriving. This finding is robust to 
alternative estimation techniques and samples. Furthermore, when disaggregating the tourist 
arrival data into local and international, international tourists seem to be more intimidated from 
homicides than locals. 
Certainly the violence exerted by the DTOs and the authorities have not only had a negative 
economic impact on Mexico but it has also represented a burden for the Mexican society. Given 
                                                          
1
 See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 12th 2012, http://www.smartraveller.gov.au. 
2
 See El Universal, January 06
th
 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx. 
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that Mexico is a relatively young country with the majority of its population falling into the age 
range of 12 to 29 years, the second chapter highlights the vulnerability of the youth who are 
faced with lack of education opportunities, unemployment and live in a highly criminal 
environment. Specifically, this essay asks whether the availability of large young male cohorts, 
or male ‘youth bulges’, low education, and high youth unemployment eases recruitment to DTOs 
and may contribute to explain variance in violent crime across Mexican states over time. The 
article tests these propositions empirically in one of the first sub-national studies of violent crime 
in a developing country. It is further the first study to look at youth bulges and violence, either 
political or criminal, in the context of both education and employment, a unique opportunity 
granted by the rare availability of such data for Mexican states. The results suggest that while 
youth crime and high homicide rates in Mexico are not associated with the ebb and flow of the 
male youth population, both high youth unemployment and low youth education are associated 
with higher levels of crime and homicide. And in this context, the relative size of the male youth 
population does matter. The paper posits that by not investing in the education of the youth, 
policymakers would make a big failure in not taking advantage of the demographic bonus 
Mexico counts with. This is important not only in terms of public security policy but also in 
terms of long run development.  
Beyond any doubt, drug trafficking and the violence it generates is a complex phenomenon 
for which there is no easy way out. Over the last thirty years Mexican authorities have relied 
heavily on the armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking by deploying troops for crop 
eradication, drug seizures and other counter-narcotics operations (Astorga and Shirk 2010, 
Kenny and Serrano 2012). This deterrence strategy accelerated greatly during the Fox and 
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Calderón administrations
3
 and has been largely criticized by scholars, the media, prominent 
personalities such as former U.N. General Secretary, Koffi Annan, as well as NGOs in Mexico 
and abroad who question whether it was the best strategy available to authorities (HRW 2012, 
2013).  
These critics argue that by solely implementing deterrent policies violent crime would not 
stop. Rather, they claim that as a result of these policies drug-related conflicts spread to regions 
which were previously unaffected. Following on this and according to the literature on the 
economics of crime, geographical space has gained importance since crime in general is affected 
not only by local factors but also by the characteristics of neighboring areas (Ratcliffe, 2010). 
Thus, it might be the case that one deterrence policy could represent a gain to one region but a 
cost to another by displacing criminal offenders to other regions. However, as argued by Morris 
(2012) and Skaperdas (2001), drug trafficking in Mexico and organized crime in general 
emanates out of the lack of power created by the absence of state enforcement. In this way, a 
noticeable pattern of corruption involves a type of revolving door, whereby state security 
officials leave government service to work for the DTO´s and DTO´s members infiltrate and 
work within the government (Morris 2012). 
In this sense, the last essay empirically investigates whether and how drug-related crime in a 
given Mexican state spreads to its neighboring states. It implements spatial econometric 
techniques to a panel data set for the 31 Mexican federal states and Mexico City over the period 
1997-2010. The results suggest a positive and significant diffusion effect of crimes related to 
drugs after controlling for political and socio-economic characteristics of regions. Furthermore, 
                                                          
3
 This corresponds to the 2000-2006 period for the Fox administration and to the 2006 to 2012 period for the 
Calderón administration. 
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after controlling for drug enforcement in neighboring states to state i, the findings suggest weak 
evidence for a deterrent effect. This implies that authorities’ deterrence measures in neighboring 
states to state i weakly reduce drug crimes in state i. 
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Chapter I 
Does Violent Crime Scare Tourists Away? Panel Data 
Evidence from 32 Mexican States 
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I.1 INTRODUCTION 
Does violent crime deter tourists from visiting Mexico? According to the United Nations World 
Tourism Organization (UNWTO 2011), Mexico was ranked in 2011 as the 10
th 
place to visit in 
the preferences of international tourists. Conversely, the country was ranked 121 out of 153 
countries by the Global Peace Index in the same year, with 153 being the most violent country. 
In the year 2006 the Mexican government decided to give a frontal fight to the different drug 
trafficking organizations (henceforth DTOs) operating all across the Mexican territory. As a 
result of this strategy violent crime in the form of homicides started to dramatically increase 
(Ríos 2012). Thus, it was not uncommon to read since the end of 2006 the headlines of 
international and national newspapers reporting the increasing wave of violence in Mexico. This 
has had a negative impact on the Mexican society. For instance, Braakman (2012) provides 
evidence on some of the non-monetary costs of crime in Mexico. His results show that men and 
women in Mexico change their behavior in response to victimization risks or actual 
victimization. These changes include the carry of a weapon for men and the change of 
transportation methods for women. Moreover, as a reaction to the violent fighting among the 
DTOs, which occurred in the year 2010 in the municipality of Mier, in the northern Mexican 
State of Tamaulipas, about 95% of the population was forced to abandon the town. This 
municipality together with many smaller municipalities along the Mexican-U.S. border became 
virtual ghost towns.
4
 A further example is the Mexican industrial capital, Monterrey. Despite its 
reputation as the most competitive and developed in the country (Mexican Institute for 
Competitiveness 2012), this city has been in several occasions scenario of increasing violence 
due to the different DTOs fighting against each other. This had a negative impact on the 
                                                          
4
 See CNN Mexico,12
th
 May 2012, http://mexico.cnn.com and 
 The Economist, 12
th
 May 2012, http://www.economist.com. 
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emerging medical tourist industry in that city. In other words, fewer tourists required to stay in 
Monterrey for medical purposes.
5
   
Moreover, after the intensification of violence from early 2007 onwards, analysts in the U.S. 
and Mexico have argued that there is a strong similarity between terrorism and attacks by the 
DTOs in Mexico.
6
 Other scholars directly argue that the Mexican DTOs are terrorists and 
explain that the tactics, organization and their goals are homogenous to those used by terrorist 
organizations, (Longmire and Longmire 2008). For instance after the detonation of hand 
grenades in a crowded public square in Morelia, capital of the state of Michoacán on Mexico´s 
Independence Day in September 2008, local and international media have gone as far as 
qualifying these attacks as terrorism. Local newspapers reported the getaway of tourists on the 
following day.
7
 Further examples of terrorism-like events occurred in 2008, 2010 and 2011 in the 
states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and Nuevo León where vehicles deliberately went off 
either in parking lots or near to police stations.
8
 Following on this, more than one country
9
 has 
recommended their citizens not to choose this country for holidays. Travel warnings for 
international tourists describe this kind of events in their alerts and express their worries about 
the integrity of people, as pointed out by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
in their Travel Advice for Mexico: “Travellers may become victims of violence directed against 
others.”10 It has been documented in Neumayer (2004) that tourists are sensible to violent events 
happening in their holiday destination and which can harm their physical integrity. He points out 
that if violent events repeatedly occur and increase their intensity, the authorities of the origin of 
                                                          
5
See: The Economist, May 27
th
 2010, http://www.economist.com  
6
 See: The Economist, November 15
th
 2010, http://www.economist.com 
7
 See: The Economist, May 27
th
 2012, http://www.economist.com  
8
See: El Sol de Hidalgo, September 17
th
 2008, http://www.oem.com.mx/elsoldehidalgo 
9
Travel Warning as of February 8
th
 2012 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
   Travel Warning as of April 4
th
 2012 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 
10
See: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 12th 2012, http://www.smartraveller.gov.au 
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tourists start warning their citizens against visiting that particular destination. Despite the 
importance of the tourism industry for the Mexican economy, there is no empirical evidence 
analyzing the extent to which violent crime affects tourism in Mexico. This paper aims at filling 
this gap in the literature. For this purpose, I use a unique dataset on tourist arrivals in each of the 
31 Mexican states and Mexico City. The advantage of these data is the distinction between 
arrivals of international tourists from those of local tourists for the 1990-2010 period. I expect 
international tourists to be more intimidated by crime than local tourists. The latter benefit from 
their location in the country and thus directly know what is going on on the ground, while the 
former are mainly informed by what they read, hear or see in the news. In this respect, different 
scholars in economics, criminology and psychology have studied the implications of these 
information asymmetries for tourism as a result of political conflicts among countries and 
terrorism. For instance, Fielding and Shortland (2009) analyze how the US tourist flows to Israel 
are affected as a result of the actual intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the intensity 
reported in US television news coverage. Their results suggest that if alternative sources of 
information are costly, then tourists may infer the current level of risk in travelling to Israel from 
the television news. A similar conclusion is provided by Romer et al. (2003) who argue that 
viewing local television news is related to increased fear of and concern about crime. 
Furthermore, Sunstein (2003) argues that one or two terrorist incidents will have a significant 
impact on thought and behavior of people, with exaggerated risk perceptions a likely result of the 
substantial publicity given to such incidents. Following on this, due to social interactions, 
knowledge about terrorist incidents spreads rapidly through the population and this in turn 
greatly aggravates fear. Earlier on, Morley (1998) highlighted that individuals are assumed to 
overcome missing information about destinations thanks to the contact with people which 
10 
 
previously visited those countries.  Moreover, Clerides et al. (2008) argue that information gaps 
are solved thanks to the activity of tour operators and travel agencies. They find that tour 
operators provide a better matching for quality with price and result in a more efficient market 
outcome. Given these previous studies it is plausible to argue that violent crime in Mexico is 
likely to facilitate a generic impression of unrest being spread all over the country.  
 In general, the articles studying tourism demand concentrate on the analysis of 
international tourism flows, neglecting the demand for national tourism. Due to the availability 
of tourism flow data, the period of study is restricted to 1990-2010. However this period takes 
into account the scaling up of crime during the years 2007-2010 when the Mexican government 
started to directly fight organized crime. The findings show that international tourist flows are 
more affected than local tourist flows after controlling for violent crime, income, price level, 
urbanization, weather, and infrastructure. As a starting point I propose a dynamic panel data 
model with fixed effects. According to Nickell (1981) the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable in a model with fixed effects results in biased estimates when the time dimension of the 
panel is small. Thus, in order to correct for this bias I implement the Least Square Dummy 
Variable estimator (LSDV) developed by Bruno (2005). Next I propose the use of two 
instruments to account for the potential reverse causality in the tourist arrivals and violent crime 
variables. This procedure allows me to account for the potential reverse causality only but not for 
the bias arising from the lagged dependent variable. Following on this, I obtain the fitted values 
of the first stage regression from the 2SLS procedure and use them in the LSDV estimation 
instead of the violent crime variable. This allows me to control not only for the lagged dependent 
variable bias but also for the potential reverse causality in the variables tourism arrivals and 
violent crime. 
11 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I.2 provides a review of the emerging 
literature on tourism demand and crime. Section I.3 explains the data selection based on the 
literature on tourism demand and presents the empirical methodology. Section I.4 discusses the 
results, while the last section concludes. The conclusion is followed by an appendix including 
graphs and robustness checks. 
 
I.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
I.2.1 Tourism Demand and Crime 
The literature on crime and tourism is small. Most work on the impact of crime on tourism 
concentrates on qualitative evidence as for instance, De Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) for the 
Caribbean, and Ferreira and Harmse (2000) for South Africa. Both studies rely on comparing 
available tourist crime victimization data in order to illustrate how crime affects tourism. De 
Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) first revise the recent history of violent and property crime in 
several Caribbean destinations and then highlight three hypotheses regarding the link between 
tourism and crime. The first of these hypotheses states that tourists in mass destinations are more 
likely to be victims of serious crimes than residents. The second hypothesis looks at the crime 
and victim type, and claims that tourists are more likely to be victimized by property crime and 
residents by violent crime. Lastly, the third hypothesis argues that the victimization rates are 
influenced by tourist density levels. The argument behind is that once tourism densities go 
beyond certain threshold levels and there are more visitors in certain locations, they are much 
more likely to be careless with their valuables, to visit dangerous areas and thus are much more 
likely to be easy preys for criminals. Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) use data on victimization 
of tourists provided by the Royal Barbados Police Force for the period 1989 till 1993 and data of 
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Barbados` resident victimization rates. By residents they refer to the inhabitants of Barbados and 
not to local tourists. Basically they compare the datasets of tourist victimization with the 
resident´s dataset and arrive at their conclusions without implementing any econometric 
methodology. For this aim they show three tables. The first one shows figures on nine different 
crimes committed against tourists and residents for the 1989-1993 period. Based on these figures 
they state that tourists are relatively secure in Barbados except from being victims of robbery. 
The second table presents the same offenses for the 1989-1993 period in the form of rates (per 
100,000 persons). By doing so, they attempt to compare levels of victimization among members 
of the host and guest group. They conclude from these figures that the local population is more 
likely to be victimized by violent crime and tourists are more victimized by property crime and 
robbery.  
The third table presents monthly data from 1990 to 1993 on the resident equivalent visitor 
population and tourist victimization rates for violent and property crime. Their figures show that 
the property crime rate against tourists is several multiples greater than the violent crime rate.  
As a further research agenda they acknowledge the need to explore whether overall crime 
rates and victimization come along with mass tourism development, or whether observed crime 
rates are influenced by island-specific determinants. 
In the same vein Ferreira and Harmse (2000) offer a qualitative study for South Africa. They 
gather statistics on the 37 most committed crimes in the main urban areas of this country for the 
year 1997. Their work does not offer an econometric analysis and concentrates in the comparison 
of crime across the main South African urban areas. Contrary to De Albuquerque and McElroy 
(1999) they do not present any hypothesis but highlight the importance of the international media 
13 
 
and its influence on tourist perception of South Africa. Moreover they also describe that tourists 
can change their preferences for a specific holiday destination if crime is present and in this way 
a so called spillover effect is expected. 
Different to the previous studies, the work by Levantis and Gani (2000) is one of the few 
quantitative studies on the issue. They study how crime affects the arrivals of tourists in four 
small Caribbean and four South Pacific islands states. As dependent variable they use the 
country`s share of total tourism flows to the region. They prefer this tourism measure over tourist 
expenditure, because the former better captures the deterrent effect of crime on travel to the 
desired destination. This is similar to Neumayer (2004), who also prefers tourism flows as a 
dependent variable since this is a more precise variable than tourists` expenditures. Levantis and 
Gani (2000) construct time series data from 1970 to 1993. Regarding the crime variable they 
argue that is not possible to compare crime rates across nations since the data availability and 
crime classifications are different across their sample. This is the reason as to why they construct 
an index of the incidence of crime for each country in order to compare the trends in crime. Only 
the index of the incidence of crime and its lagged value are used in their model due to the lack of 
data for other determinants of tourism at the country level. They find that crime negatively 
affects the demand for tourism. 
I.2.2 Tourism and Crime in Mexico 
Several developing countries have seen tourism as a strategy for economic development and as 
the United Nations World Tourism Organization documents, tourism provides about 6 to 7% of 
the world´s jobs and millions more indirectly via the multiplier effect in other sectors. 
Furthermore, it accounts for 30% of the world´s exports of services (US$ 1 trillion a year) and 
45% of the total export of services in developing countries (UNWTO 2010). More specifically, 
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for Mexico the tourism industry contributed 8.9% of the country´s GDP in the year 2009 and is 
after oil exports and remittances the third source of foreign currency for the country (Tourism 
Ministry of Mexico 2011-2012). Since it is one of the most important industries of the country, it 
is of paramount importance to identify the role played by violent crime.  
As of now there is no empirical evidence arguing that organized crime is targeting the tourism 
industry in Mexico as a way to exert political pressure on the Mexican government. According to 
Dell (2011), the motivation for violence among the DTOs is the fight to take over the control of 
the routes of drugs from Mexico to the United States. Following on this, the increasing violence 
in Mexico consists primarily of drug traffickers killing each other.  
More recently, Ríos (2012) has investigated why violence has dramatically increased in the 
last 4 1/2 years in Mexico. According to her research, the wave of violence hitting Mexico can 
be explained, on the one hand, by homicides as a result of traffickers fighting each other when 
competing for territories and on the other, by the enforcement operations taken by the Mexican 
Federal Government to arrest drug traffickers. These enforcement operations have had a negative 
externality on the country. Ríos (2012) calls this a self-reinforcing equilibrium; more precisely, 
the situation in which the government weakens the structure of the DTOs and this in turn fuels 
the incentives of DTOs to fight among them and eliminate the weakest DTOs. In the short run 
the costs of this strategy are reflected in an increase in violence. In the long run, the DTOs will 
weaken enough so that violence will stop.   
Undoubtedly, this situation has put lot of burden on the Mexican society and damaged the 
reputation of the country. Given that tourism represents one of the most important industries in 
Mexico, I analyze whether there is an effect of violence on the tourism industry. 
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I.3 DATA AND METHOD  
 
The data used in the paper is a panel dataset across 32 Mexican states (including the Federal 
District, also known as Mexico City) during the 1990–2010 period. The following specification 
estimates the tourists arrivals ( itTA ) (logged), in state i in year t as a function of past tourist 
arrivals, 1ln itTA , homicides ln itH  and a vector of control variables itZ :  
 
)1(,lnlnln 1 titiitititit ZHTATA     
where i  denotes state fixed effects to control for unobserved state specific heterogeneity in the 
panel dataset, t represents time specific dummies and ti is the error term. I cluster the standard 
errors by state to deal with concerns with serial correlation. 
On the one hand, Mexico is a very diverse country in terms of traditions, culture and 
geography. All these factors are captured by state fixed effects. On the other hand, the time 
specific dummies capture common year’s shocks such as tourism advertising abroad on behalf of 
the central government through the Mexican Tourism Ministry. The inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable is theoretically plausible since it allows me to control for the loyalty of 
tourists to the different Mexican states and the Federal District. For the dependent variable I 
follow Neumayer (2004) and use the log number of tourists arriving in each of the 31 Mexican 
states and the Federal District. The data report the amount of tourists arriving in hotels in state i 
in Mexico in year t, reported by the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI 
hereafter) for the 31 Mexican states and the Federal District.  
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In 2005 INEGI was delinked from the Ministry of Finance and became an autonomous 
institution. The main task of INEGI is to conduct the population and economic censuses across 
Mexican states and Municipalities. Through their local offices INEGI collects the arrival of 
tourists’ data from each of the local Tourism Ministries in each state and the Federal District. By 
law, hotels in Mexico have to report the amount of tourists who required overnight 
accommodation to the local Tourism Ministry. These figures form part of the statistical 
yearbooks of each state and Mexico City. Through its website, INEGI provides all the statistical 
yearbooks for all states and the Federal District which contains, among several other variables, 
the arrival of tourists as explained above.
11
 An advantage of these data is the fact that the number 
of tourist arrivals can be separated into international and national tourist arrivals. Unfortunately, 
the dataset does neither provide information on the different nationalities of international tourists 
nor on the states of origin of the local tourists. 
 I use three variables of tourist arrivals. First, I look at overall arrivals of tourists. Second, I 
separate the international tourist arrivals from the national tourist arrivals and compare the effect 
that violent crime has on both tourist categories. In order to capture violent crime, I use the 
number of deaths resulting from homicides reported in state i in year t. The rationale for this is 
that violent events leading to several killings attract more the attention of local and international 
media. For instance, at the time of writing of this paper there has been again a mass killing in 
different locations of Mexico. Soon after this event the coverage of this notice was to be found in 
several newspapers across the world.
12
 
                                                          
11
 See: http://www.inegi.org.mx  
12
 See: Le Monde, http://www.lemonde.fr ; BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
http://www.faz.net, (accessed  on May 13
th
 2012). 
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The dataset on homicides comes from the yearly mortality statistics gathered by INEGI
13
 and 
corresponds to the period 1990-2010. The homicides are registered in the agency of the Public 
Ministry of the municipality where the crime took place. This information is then delivered to the 
local INEGI offices across the different states and forms part of the Mortality Statistics of 
INEGI.  
It is important to mention that for all crime data in Mexico provided by INEGI there is the 
distinction to be made between the so called “register year” and “occurrence year.” The former 
represents the year in which a criminal offence was registered and the latter shows the exact year 
in which a criminal offence took place. It is usually the case that criminal offences are not 
always, for several reasons, reported to the authorities when they happen. Thus the raw data 
show that there are crimes which for instance occurred in 1990, but are not registered until 1998. 
Using the occurrence year data I only consider homicides which took place from 1990 onwards 
since the availability on tourism data starts from 1990 onwards.  
Figures I.1, I.2 and I.3 show the number of tourist arrivals across the states during the 1990-
2010 period. Figure I.1 shows the highest number of total tourist arrivals in the Federal District, 
Veracruz, Jalisco and Quintana Roo in this order. From Figure I.2 we can see that most 
international tourists visit the following states: Quintana Roo, Distrito Federal, Baja California 
and Jalisco. These states are internationally known for their beaches in the Caribbean Sea and the 
Pacific Ocean and are home of several archeological parks and Mexican folklore. From Figure 
I.3, we see that national tourists visit more frequently the Federal District, Veracruz, Jalisco and 
Guerrero. Figure I.4 shows the number of homicides which took place across states during the 
1990-2010 period. It can be seen that most homicides took place in the following states: Estado 
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de Mexico, Federal District, Chihuahua, Baja California, Guerrero, Michoacan, Oaxaca, and 
Sinaloa. Most of these states are also victims of intense drug violence between the drug cartels 
and the state police and military forces (Ríos 2012). Furthermore, Figure I.5 shows how violence 
is distributed across states if we consider homicides as a rate per 100,000 inhabitants. We see 
that in this case Chihuahua is the most violent state followed by Sinaloa and Guerrero. This is in 
line with the recent work by Ríos (2012) mentioned above. Next, Figures I.6, I.7, I.8 and I.9 
show the raw data for homicides, international, national and overall tourists at the country level 
respectively. There are interesting issues to be observed in these four figures. First, while the 
number of homicides decreases from approximately 1995 onwards, the number of international 
and national tourists increases. Second, as the number of homicides skyrocketed from 
approximately 2006 onwards, the number of international tourist arrivals decreased to levels of 
2002. Third, in relative terms, this drop was less for the national tourist arrivals and fourth we 
see that national tourism recovers but this is not the case for international tourists.  
 
Having described the two main variables of interest I turn now to the vector of control 
variables (Zit) which includes other potential determinants of tourist arrivals reported in state i 
during year t. I select these control variables from the existing literature on the subject.  
The literature on tourism demand has focused on the study of international tourism while 
neglecting the study of national/local tourism. This literature can broadly be divided in two 
groups: The first group corresponds to contributions whose aim is to forecast tourism statistics as 
number of nights of stay, expenditures by tourists and /or the number of tourists arriving. For 
instance, the work by Witt and Witt (1995), Lim (1997a, 1997b and 1999) and Li et al. (2005) 
provide a good overview of articles on tourism demand forecasting. The second group of 
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contributions concentrates on explaining its determinants. Within this group, the papers by 
Crouch (1994), Poirirer (1997), Cothran and Cothran (1998), Sonmez (1998), Sonmez and 
Graefe (1998), Neumayer (2004), and Clerides et al. (2008) provide an overview of the 
determinants of international tourism flows.  
Crouch (1994) reviews the literature on the determinants of international tourist flows. He 
argues that research in the 1980´s has found income elasticities of demand above unity 
confirming in this way the view that foreign travel is a luxury good. I use the natural logarithm 
of the gross domestic product per capita in state i during year t as a proxy. I expect a positive and 
significant effect. A better economic environment enhances appropriate conditions for the stay of 
tourists. These data were collected from the National Accounts System of INEGI. 
Furthermore researchers have used a wide variety of variables to represent prices in their 
models. In the context of international tourism demand, the variables used to represent prices 
have been foreign currency prices of tourist goods and services in destinations, the cost of 
transportation between origin and destination country and the effect of exchange rate variations 
on purchasing power. Put differently, as consumers, tourists also decide where to go based on the 
price of the goods they want to purchase; for instance holiday packages, which in some cases 
include flights and hotel reservations. In order to account for the differences in prices I use the 
price levels
14
 of the main cities in each Mexican state and the Federal District. These data were 
computed by the Mexican Central Bank and are used in the construction of the main national 
inflation index. Since the summer 2011, INEGI is responsible for conducting the inflation 
measurement and for reporting it to the Federal Government and to the public. However, since I 
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only consider the period 1990-2010, these data are taken from the Mexican Central Bank. I 
expect a negative and significant impact of this variable. Higher prices can induce tourists to visit 
some other cheaper destination. 
Another important determinant of tourism demand is nature. Within this literature, one of the 
earliest studies addressing how climate in the tourist destination affects the arrival of tourists is 
the work by Abegg and Koenig (1997) in which they evaluated how predicted changes in 
weather conditions affected the winter tourism industry in Switzerland. They found that under 
“winter-normal” climate conditions, 85% of all Swiss ski areas are reliable for the practice of 
winter sports. Nevertheless if temperatures would rise by 2 grades Celsius, this number would 
drop to 63%. Along these lines the papers by Faulkner (2001) and Murphy and Bayley (1989) 
have offered qualitative assessments as to how to deal with natural disasters in tourist locations. 
Following on this and given the geographic location of Mexico with a coast length of 7,828 
kilometers on the Pacific Ocean side and with a coast length of 3,249 kilometers on the side of 
the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, the country experiences throughout a year several 
tropical storms which derive in hurricanes of high intensity. Thus, I use the number of hurricanes 
which caused the worst floods in state i during year t and construct a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one if a state was hit by a hurricane in year t. In general, a hurricane can hit 
more than one state in the same year. The data are from the Meteorological National Service
15
 
and from the Engineering Institute of the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(UNAM).
16
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See: http://www.smn.cna.gob.mx (Accessed on October 1st 2012). 
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 See: http://www.iingen.unam.mx (Retrieved on October 1st 2012). 
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I also include a control variable which accounts for urbanization. This is the amount of people 
living in urban areas as a share of total population in state i during year t. I expect a positive and 
significant effect of this variable since urban areas are known for providing a wide range of 
amenities for tourists, for instance health services and public transport. This variable is drawn 
from the population census data compiled by INEGI. Additionally, I control for the transport 
infrastructure within the country by using the log of the number of kilometers of roads available 
in state i during year t. The data are from the Transportation and Communications Ministry of 
each state. These statistics are as well provided to INEGI and form part of the statistical 
yearbooks of each state too. I would expect a positive and significant effect of this variable on 
the arrivals of tourists. Once in the country, tourists might be willing to visit other cities or towns 
near to their first destination. It is true that some tourists would prefer to use air transportation. 
However, there is not much variation trough time in the number of airports in each state.  
I.3.1 Endogeneity 
It can potentially be the case that the number of tourists visiting a country originates more crime. 
Tourists are new to the destination they visit; this lack of information puts them in a riskier 
situation more easily than local people. Thus, criminals may see in them an easier prey. This 
applies to both national and international tourists. While I am not aware of any variable which at 
the same time exerts any form of variation in the number of tourist arrivals and the number of 
homicides and is omitted from my specification, in general, the endogeneity problem in an 
econometric model can not only be due to the reverse causality as outlined above but also due to 
third omitted variables which affect both of the variables involved. 
 
In order to account for potential endogeneity I employ a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
model. The validity of an estimation based on this method relies on the choice of a proper 
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instrument. The instrumental variable must fulfil two criteria. The first one refers to the 
relevance of the instrument, i.e., it must induce sufficient exogenous variation in the explanatory 
variable in question, in particular,   0, HomicidesZCov . According to Bound, Jaeger and 
Baker (1995) the F-statistic of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression should be 
examined in order to assess the relevance of the instruments. In a further contribution, Staiger 
and Stock (1997) argue that the selected instruments would be relevant when the first stage 
regression model´s F statistic reaches the thumb rule threshold of 10. This F-statistic has been 
criticized in the literature as an insufficient measure of relevance (Stock et al. 2002; Hahn and 
Hausman 2002 and 2003). Thus, the present paper also shows more powerful tests like the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (Kleibergen-Paap 2006), which is a statistic for testing the null 
hypothesis that the equation is underidentified. This test is a heteroscedasticity-robust variant of 
the Anderson canonical correlation test.
17  As long as the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is above 
the critical value of 10 the used instruments are not considered to be weak. 
The second instrument criteria states that the ideal instrument should show   0, wZCov , i.e., 
it must not be correlated with the error term of the second-stage regression. This means that
 
the 
instrument should not affect the arrivals of tourists through other channels than the endogenous 
variable, controlled for the other variables in the model.  
 I propose the use of two instruments in an attempt to control for endogeneity in the model: 
The first instrument is the adult illiteracy rate within the population older than 15 years across 
the 31 Mexican states and the Federal District. The data come from the Ministry of Education of 
Mexico. This variable is intended to be a proxy for social exclusion.  The rationale here is that 
social exclusion directly affects the increase in violent outcomes. For instance, the work by 
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 See: Kleibergen and Paap (2006) for further details.  
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Caldeira (2000); Heinemann and Verner (2006), Borjas (1995); Katzman (1999), Buvinic, 
Morrison and Orlando (2002) and Beato (2002) show that socially excluded communities have 
higher illiteracy rates, higher numbers of homicides, higher percentages of employment in the 
informal sector, higher child mortality and an underdeveloped urban infrastructure. Following on 
this, illiteracy impedes the opportunities for participation in the labour market and thus reduces 
the income of individuals and their chances to be included in society. For instance, using data 
from two groups of British adults born in 1958 and 1970, Parsons (2002) found a significant 
association between repeated offending and poor literacy or numeracy scores, particularly among 
young men. 
In addition to these arguments, the work by Lochner and Moretti (2004) states that education 
may affect crime in several ways. First, it increases the wage rate of individuals, thereby 
increasing the opportunity cost of committing a crime. Second, if arrested, the punishment would 
be more costly for the more educated than for the less educated, i.e., the time out of the labor 
market due to incarceration represents a higher opportunity cost for those educated. They find 
that education significantly reduces crime. Based on this, it is reasonable to expect that illiteracy 
exerts variation in the homicide variable. On the other hand, there is no reason to suspect that 
illiteracy is directly correlated with the dependent variable, i.e., tourists arrivals, in particular 
when controlling for economic welfare in the estimation. As outlined in the second section of the 
paper, tourism demand is influenced by different factors than illiteracy.   
The second instrument is a proxy for the severity of punishment of committing a homicide. 
According to Becker´s model of crime and punishment (Becker 1968) an individual would 
compare the expected utility of participation in legal and illegal activities. If punishment is more 
severe, it follows that the cost of deviating from “good behavior” is higher and the crime rate is 
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reduced. Thus, such a variable would induce a direct variation in the homicide rate but does not 
directly influence the arrival of tourists. Following this literature, I construct a variable which 
proxies for the severity of punishment by calculating the rate of incarceration of people who 
have committed a homicide across the Mexican States and the Federal District within the period 
1990-2010. For this aim I use the data coming from INEGI. This dataset registers the criminals 
who have been arrested on charges of homicide and who have been dictated an imprisonment 
sentence. Thus I divide the number of imprisoned persons with sentence in state i at time t by the 
amount of homicides which took place in state i at time t and multiply this by one hundred. It 
could be that more homicides lead to a higher incarceration rate, however the number of 
imprisonment sentences depends on the quality of the judiciary system and thus an increase in 
homicides does not necessarily mean that the incarceration rate will increase as well (Zepeda 
2004). The judiciary system is responsible for effectively punishing those individuals who have 
committed a homicide. However, as documented in the media
18
 and in the literature, impunity is 
a rampant problem of the judiciary Mexican system and the incarceration of innocent people is 
not an exception, (Zepeda 2004).  
 
 
I.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Table I.1 presents the baseline results capturing the effect of homicides on the arrival of overall 
tourists, international tourists and national tourists implementing the model outlined above.
19
 
Beginning with column 1 in table I.1, the results show that, when using the homicide data from 
INEGI and holding other factors constant, a one percent increase in homicides leads to 0.12 
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 See: La Jornada, http://www.jornada.unam.mx (Retrieved on October 7th 2012). 
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 According to the Hausman test, the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects model. The test result 
is available upon request. 
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percent decrease in tourism, at the 5% significance level. It is interesting to ask whether this 
effect is similar or not for international and national tourists. I expect that international tourist are 
more deterred by violent crime than national tourists. The latter have more information to what is 
happening in the country. Thus, they have the advantage of better knowing where violence is 
worst and where not. The former receive the information about crime in Mexico through the 
international news. When a criminal event of high impact takes place, this is promptly 
communicated in the international media. Following on this, the countries of origin of the 
international tourists warn their people not to visit certain places in the country or better to 
choose completely other destinations for holiday. In order to consider this, column 2 shows the 
effect of violent crime/ homicides on the arrival of international tourists. When holding other 
factors constant, a one percent increase in homicide leads to a 0.31 percent decrease on the 
international tourist arrivals. This effect is significant at the one percent level. It is interesting to 
see that the effect of violent crime on international tourism is bigger than tourism in general. 
Next, I look at whether this effect is the same or not for national tourists. This is done in column 
3 which shows that, holding other factors constant, the effect of homicides on national tourist 
arrivals is a significant decrease of 0.9 percent at the 10% significance level. In general this first 
table of results shows that violent crime actually deters both types of tourists however this effect 
seems to be stronger for the international visitors.
20
  
Relying on these results, it is not possible yet to give a definitive answer to the research 
question of the paper. According to Nickell (1981) and Hsiao (1986), in a short fixed effects 
panel model, the correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variable may 
render the estimates of the parameters biased and inconsistent. This issue is quite serious in panel 
                                                          
20
 The difference of the coefficients is statistically significant at the 5% level. I tested for the significance of the 
difference in a nested model, interacting an international tourist dummy with all explanatory variables and the state 
and year dummies. The results are not shown in order to save space. 
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data sets with a small number of time series observations. Increasing the number of units would 
not lead to better estimates if the number of time series observations remains small (Anderson 
and Hsiao, 1982). In order to obtain consistent estimators, one possibility could be to implement 
instrumental estimators. Nevertheless it is important to note that, although GMM and IV 
estimators possess good asymptotic properties, these estimators are still biased in a finite sample 
application, when n is small, (Bruno 2005a, 2005b). I follow Potrafke (2009) and use the 
Dynamic Bias corrected Least Squares estimator proposed by Bruno (2005a, 2005b). Using 
asymptotic expansion techniques, Kiviet (1995, 1999) calculates approximation formulas for 
correcting the finite-sample bias of the least square estimator. In a further paper, Bun and Kiviet 
(2003) redevelop Kiviet´s (1999) bias approximation using a simpler expression. Bruno (2005a) 
generalizes the bias approximation formula of Bun and Kiviet (2003) and extends the analysis 
for unbalanced panels. The bias-correction procedure involves consistent estimates as a first step. 
These consistent estimates are based on one out of the three following estimators, namely the 
Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimators. I choose the Blundell-Bond 
(1998) system GMM estimator since it is superior with respect to the other two in terms of 
efficiency (Baltagi 2008).
21
 Table I.2 presents the results of the model when implementing the 
Dynamic Bias Corrected Estimator (henceforth LSDV) proposed by Bruno (2005).   
The estimates of homicides coefficients in table I.2 are similar in magnitude to the previous 
Fixed Effects specification. Looking at the first column and keeping all other variables constant, 
a one percent increase in homicides leads to a reduction of 0.12 percent in the arrivals of tourists 
in general; this is statistically significant at the 10% level. Further, column 2 shows the results 
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 As in Potrafke (2009), the results obtained from this method refer to the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator as 
the initial one. The instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2006). I also undertake 50 repetitions of the 
procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. The results are similar when changing the number of 
repetitions to 100, 200 or 500. 
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for the foreign tourist arrivals specification. In this model a one percent increase in homicides 
results in fewer arrivals of foreign tourists by 0.30 percent, all else equal. This result is similar to 
its corresponding Fixed Effects version in Table I.1. However, the result under the LSDV 
estimator is significant only at the 5% level. Until this point the results in table I.2 are similar to 
those in table I.1. Looking next at column 3, and contrary to the Fixed Effects specification, the 
arrivals of national tourists seem not to be affected by violent crime since the significance of the 
violent crime variable disappears in this model. Thus, violent crime has a bigger negative effect 
on the arrival of international tourists than on the arrival of national tourists.
22
 As previously 
mentioned, this can be due to information asymmetries in the sense that national tourists might 
be better informed than the international tourists and thus, they may be less concerned about high 
criminality in states in general as long as they know how to avoid risky situations.  
With respect to the control variables, table I.1 shows that prices matter for the local tourists 
only. We see that, holding other factors constant, a one percent increase in the price level reduces 
the arrivals of national tourists by 0.3 percent. In contrast, price levels are not a significant 
determinant of international tourism flows. Most of the international tourists visiting Mexico are 
coming from the United States, Canada and European countries belonging to the European 
Monetary Union. It could be argued that since the international tourists possess a higher 
purchasing power, prices are more a concern for local tourists. However, this effect is only 
significant at the 10% level. Furthermore this variable is no longer significant in table 2. 
Arguably, the higher the concentration of people in cities, the higher are the victimization 
rates of crimes as pointed out by Gaviria and Páges (2002) in their study on Patterns of crime 
victimization in Latin American cities. However, cities not only have problems but also 
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advantages as agglomeration of services and amenities which are attractive for tourists. Thus, 
holding other factors constant, a one percent increase in the share of people living in urban areas 
leads to a 0.3 percent increase in the arrival of tourists. This effect is significant at the 5% level 
in table I.1 under the fixed effects specification. Table I.2 shows for this variable a coefficient of 
0.033 percent, at a significance level of 10%. Additionally, international tourists are more 
attracted to urban areas than national tourists. This is consistent in both tables.
23
 However the 
LSDV estimations show significance at the 10% level for both types of tourists and tourists in 
general. Finally, I expect path dependence in tourist arrivals, i.e., past arrivals of tourists 
explaining a part of today´s arrivals. For instance, if visitors of a certain location have an 
enjoyable experience during their stay, they might visit the same location or country again in the 
future. They may also influence other fellow citizens when they return back to their place of 
residence by recommending places to visit. We see in tables I.1 and I.2 that past tourist arrivals 
do matter for today´s arrivals. These results remain significant at the 1% level for international 
and national tourists and both together. Interestingly, I do not find any effects of per capita GDP, 
storms and highways.  
 So far the LSDV estimator has taken into account the bias inherent in the model due to the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. However there is still a further issue to be dealt with, 
namely the potential reverse causality of the variables tourism and homicides. Since the dynamic 
bias-corrected estimator does not account for this problem,
24
 as a next step I present in table I.3 
the results of the 2SLS estimation with state and time fixed effects using the external instruments 
introduced in the previous section.  
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 Despite the use of system GMM as an initial estimator, the LSDV Bruno (2005) estimator sets only the lagged 
dependent variable as endogenous but does not control for the endogeneity of further explanatory variables in the 
model. For details see Bruno (2005a) and Bruno (2005b). 
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Table I.3 reports the results for the second stage regressions followed by the first stage 
regressions for each of the three subsamples; namely total of tourists, international tourists and 
national tourists. In order to obtain the instrumental variable estimation, I regress the variable 
homicides on tourist arrivals and all other regressors at the first stage. In this way the predicted 
values of homicides are obtained which then enter into the second stage regression to obtain an 
unbiased estimator for the homicide variable. If it happens to be the case, the weakness of the 
instruments will render the coefficient of the homicide variable biased. By the same token, this 
bias will be negatively correlated with the first stage F-statistic of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the instruments (illiteracy rate and incarceration rate) equal zero. Staiger and 
Stock (1997) argue that in order to avoid this problem the first stage F-statistic should show a 
value larger than 10. As can be seen at the bottom of table I.3, the models show an F-statistic of 
22.51, 21.51 and 21.82 for the three tourists specification categories, rejecting in this way the 
null hypothesis that both of the selected instruments are not relevant. The Kleibergen-Paap 
underindentification LM test rejects as well this null hypothesis with test scores of 11.71, 11.14 
and 11.27 suggesting that the implemented instruments are adequate to identify the equation. 
Furthermore, the Hansen J-statistic with p-values of 0.88, 0.19 and 0.81 shows that the null-
hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the conventional level of significance. 
Column 1 of table I:3 shows that, keeping all other variables constant, a one percent increase 
in homicides leads to a 0.22 percent decrease of tourism as a whole. This effect is significant at 
the 5% level. Furthermore, the first stage regression of the first model, displayed in Column 1a, 
shows that an increase in the illiteracy rate by one percentage point increases homicides by 0.16 
percent, all things else hold constant. This result is significant at the 1% level. In this way, 
illiteracy as a proxy for social exclusion causes violent crime to increase. Next, if the 
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incarceration rate due to homicides increases by one percent, violent crime is reduced by 0.004 
percent. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Interestingly, as column 2 shows, there is no significant effect of homicides on the arrival of 
international tourists. However, the endogeneity test for all three models at the bottom of table 
I.3 shows that the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the homicides variable cannot be rejected 
(with p-values of 0.35, 0.99 and 0.24). According to this test there is no reverse causality going 
from tourism to homicides. In this sense, the results of the LSDV Bruno estimator provide the 
preferred estimation since this method is superior to the (2SLS) fixed effects estimation which 
does not control for the Nickell (1981) bias inherent in the lagged dependent variable. 
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I.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated whether there is an effect of violent crime on tourism in Mexico for 
the 1990-2010 period. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, addressing endogeneity the 
paper finds that the impact of violent crime on tourism in Mexico is negative and significant. 
Second, this paper investigates whether international tourists or local tourists are more affected 
by violent crime. Due to the lack of data, previous research has concentrated only on the analysis 
of international tourism flows. First, my findings show that tourist arrivals in Mexican states are 
reduced by increased violent crime. Second, international tourists appear to be more intimidated 
by violent crime than local tourists. As argued in previous research by Morley (1998) and 
Clerides et al. (2008), information asymmetries play a role in tourism demand. Thus by living in 
the country, local tourists know better where crime is higher than international tourist do. For 
instance, an average Mexican would certainly know that violent crime is less in the state of 
Guanajuato than in the state of Tamaulipas or any other state in the north border to the United 
States. On the other hand, international tourists are mostly informed by what they hear or read in 
the news. 
In terms of tourism policy the findings suggest that by better informing and promoting 
tourism in Mexico abroad this negative effect could be alleviated. Efforts on behalf of the 
Mexican Federal government have recently been made. Future studies might look at whether 
these investments in tourism promotion have been effective. Using spatial econometric 
techniques, further research on this topic could look at whether tourists move to different 
locations in order to avoid dangerous regions. 
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Table I.1: Tourist Arrivals, Total, International and National (1990-2010):  
State fixed Effects estimations  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
Tourists 
Arrivals: 
Total 
Tourists 
Arrivals: 
Foreign 
Tourists 
Arrivals: 
National 
LDV (log) t-1  0.580*** 0.474*** 0.635*** 
 
(0.0629) (0.0860) (0.0521) 
Homicide (log)   -0.123** -0.307*** -0.0944* 
 
(0.0570) (0.105) (0.0537) 
Price level   -0.0265 -0.0424 -0.0336* 
 
(0.0225) (0.0410) (0.0194) 
State per Capita GDP (log) 0.0187 0.490 -0.0161 
 
(0.318) (0.550) (0.300) 
Urbanization 0.0282** 0.0603** 0.0296** 
 
(0.0126) (0.0268) (0.0113) 
Storms -0.0293 -0.0357 -0.0338 
 
(0.0415) (0.0809) (0.0391) 
Roads (log) -0.00795 -0.133 0.0183 
 (0.0826) (0.220) (0.0777) 
Constant 5.038*** 3.631 3.960** 
 (1.825) (3.389) (1.776) 
Hausman test p > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Year and State dummies YES YES YES 
Number of States 31 31 31 
Number of Observations 497 492 494 
R-squared 0.535 0.326 0.603 
Method Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
                  Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I.2: Tourist Arrivals, Total, International and National (1990-2010):  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
Arrivals: 
Total 
Arrivals: 
Foreign 
Arrivals: 
National 
LDV (log) t-1  0.697*** 0.567*** 0.730*** 
 
(0.0483) (0.0515) (0.0461) 
Homicide (log)  -0.118* -0.295** -0.0896 
 
(0.0678) (0.134) (0.0673) 
Price level   -0.0317 -0.0485 -0.0383 
 
(0.0276) (0.0512) (0.0329) 
State per Capita GDP (log) 0.101 0.481 0.0977 
 
(0.405) (0.645) (0.333) 
Urbanization 0.0332* 0.0662* 0.0355* 
 
(0.0201) (0.0338) (0.0193) 
Storms -0.0124 -0.0278 -0.0302 
 
(0.151) (0.0957) (0.0506) 
Roads (log) 0.0124 -0.108 0.0457 
 (0.151) (0.296) (0.130) 
Year and State dummies YES YES YES 
Number of States 31 31 31 
Number of Observations 497 492 494 
Method LSDV LSDV LSDV 
                   Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I.3: Tourist Arrivals, Total, International and National (1990-2010):  
Fixed Effects 2SLS estimations (Instruments: Illiteracy rate and Imprisonment rate due to homicide) 
  (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (3) (3a) 
Variables 
Total  
Arrivals  
First stage 
regression 
Foreign 
Arrivals 
First stage 
regression 
National 
Arrivals 
First stage 
regression 
  
Homicide 
(log)  
Homicide 
(log)    
Homicide 
(log) 
Dependent Variable- (log) t-1  0.569*** -0.071 0.478*** -0.063** 0.623*** -0.071 
 
(0.0549) (0.0488) (0.0808) (0.0299) (0.0475) (0.0499) 
Homicide (log)   -0.218**  -0.241  -0.207**  
 
(0.0901)  (0.2021)  (0.0886)  
Illiteracy  0.149***  0.147***  0.144*** 
  (0.0305)  (0.0312)  (0.0302) 
Imprisonment rate  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Price level   -0.031 -0.017 -0.046 -0.015 -0.0381** -0.018 
 
(0.0216) (0.0237) (0.0382) (0.0244) (0.0193) (0.0248) 
State per Capita GDP (log) 0.132 -0.049 0.612 0.021 0.0832 -0.025 
 
(0.3098) (0.5019) (0.5023) (0.4885) (0.288) (0.4964) 
Urbanization 0.029** 0.039* 0.057** 0.042 0.0310*** 0.039* 
 
(0.0122) (0.0205) (0.0269) (0.0200)** (0.0108) (0.0206) 
Storms -0.029 -0.011 -0.038 -0.008 -0.033 -0.011 
 
(0.0394) (0.0320) (0.0759) (0.0329) (0.0369) (0.0326) 
Roads (log) -0.016 0.062 -0.100 0.060 -0.00029 0.056 
 (0.0741) (0.0925) (0.1911) (0.0938) (0.0722) (0.0948) 
F-statistic   22.51  21.51  21.82 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.8827  0.1904  0.8187 
Kleibergen Paap LM test  11.71  11.14  11.27 
Endogeneity test (p-value)  0.3462  0.9893  0.2376 
Year and State dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of Observations 494 494 489 489 491 491 
R-squared 0.5309 0.5802 0.3273 0.5837 0.598 0.5793 
Method FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS 
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
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I.1 Appendix  
 
Outliers 
In order to identify outliers in the previous estimations I implement graphs showing the linear 
relationship between homicides and (total, international, national) tourist arrivals, controlling for 
all other explanatory variables. Using these graphs I identified those observations which lie far 
away from the regression line and removed them from the dataset. 
For the Total Tourists Arrivals model the removed observations were the five lying at the 
bottom (see Figure I.A), for the International Tourists Arrivals models the removed observations 
were the three lying at the bottom and four lying above the regression line with the largest 
distance (see Figure I.B). Finally, for the National Tourists Arrivals models the removed 
observations were the four lying at the bottom which show the largest distance to the regression 
line (see Figure I.C). Tables I.1a, I.2a and I.3a show the regression results after having removed 
these observations.  
Table I.1a still shows that homicides reduce total tourist arrivals; this effect has a magnitude 
of minus 0.11 percent and is significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the effect of violent crime 
on national tourist arrivals is now significant at the 5% level and with a value of minus 0.11 per 
cent. Furthermore, the effect of homicides on international tourist arrivals is now of minus 0.23 
percent and significant at the 5%. In general table I.1a shows that after excluding the outliers the 
results are similar to those in table I.1 in the sense that the effect of violent crime on the arrival 
of international tourists is bigger than the effect observed on the national tourist arrivals.
25
    
                                                          
25 The difference in the nested model is statistically significant at the 5% level (not shown). 
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Looking now at table I.2a, the results are also similar to those in table I.2. Column one of 
table I.2a shows that, all things else equal, a one percentage point increase in homicides reduces 
tourist arrivals by 0.11 percent. This effect is significant at the 10% level. Further, column 2 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in homicides, all else equal, leads to a reduction in 
international tourist arrivals by 0.22 percent. This figure is significant at the 1 % level. On the 
other hand, column 3 shows that, all else equal, a one percentage point increase in homicides 
reduces the arrival of national tourists by 0.11 percent. This effect is significant at the 10% level. 
Table I.3a shows the results for the 2SLS estimation after removing the above mentioned 
outliers. Column 1 shows that, all things else equal, a one percentage point increase in homicides 
reduces tourist arrivals by 0.25 percent. This effect is significant at the 1% level. Column 2 
shows that, all things else equal, a one percentage point increase in homicides leads to a 
reduction in the arrival of international tourists by 0.30 per cent. Different than table I.3, this 
effect is now significant at the 10% level. Continuing with column 3 and keeping all other 
controls constant, a one percentage point increase in homicides reduces the arrivals of national 
tourists by 0.24 percent. This effect is significant at the 1% level.  
Furthermore, after the removal of the outliers, the F statistic, the Kleibergen-Paap 
underindentification LM test and Hansen test still lend support to the relevance and the validity 
of the implemented instruments.   
In detail, the F statistic shows the values of 22.43, 21.61 and 22.09 for the total, international 
and national tourist arrivals respectively. Additionally, the Kleibergen Paap LM test shows the 
values of 11.7, 11.11 and 11.21 for the three models. These tests strongly show that the used 
instruments are relevant. Furthermore and as in table I:3, the Hansen J-statistic with p-values of 
37 
 
0.84, 0.45 and 0.88 shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 
conventional level of significance for all three models.  
 As explained before, the LSDV Bruno estimator accounts only for the bias inherent in the 
lagged dependent variable, while overlooking the potential endogeneity in the homicide variable. 
In order to correct for this shortcoming, I re-estimate the model with the LSDV Bruno estimator 
using the fitted values of the first stage regression from the 2SLS estimation and replace the 
homicide variable with them. Table I.4 shows the corresponding results. From column 1 can be 
seen that, all things else equal, a one percentage point increase in the fitted values which explain 
homicides, reduces tourist arrivals by 0.18 percent. This effect is significant at the 10% level. 
Column 2 shows that, all things else equal, a one percentage point increase in the fitted values 
which explain homicides, reduces international tourist arrivals by 0.29 percent. This effect is 
significant at the 10% level. The last column shows the effect of a one percentage point increase 
in the fitted values explaining homicides on the national tourist arrivals. This amounts to a 
reduction of 0.17 percent. This effect is significant at the 10% level. These last results show that 
the negative effect of violent crime on tourist arrivals is not driven by the neglect of the potential 
endogeneity of the homicide variable in the LSDV Bruno estimator.      
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Table I.1a: Tourist Arrivals, Total, International and National (1990-2010):  
Fixed Effects estimations  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
Tourists 
Arrivals: 
Total 
Tourists 
Arrivals: 
Foreign 
Tourists 
Arrivals: 
National 
Dependent Variable- (log) t-1  0.589*** 0.554*** 0.630*** 
 
(0.0518) (0.0534) (0.0531) 
Homicide (log)   -0.112* -0.229** -0.106** 
 
(0.0563) (0.0959) (0.0487) 
Price level   -0.016 -0.0515 -0.0305* 
 
(0.0202) (0.0441) (0.0168) 
State per Capita GDP (log) -0.349 0.390 -0.322 
 
(0.288) (0.522) (0.278) 
Urbanization 0.0377*** 0.0604** 0.0359*** 
 
(0.0122) (0.0231) (0.0113) 
Storms -0.0329 -0.0353 -0.025 
 
(0.0343) (0.0649) (0.0369) 
Roads (log) 0.038 0.001 0.0517 
 (0.0660) (0.204) (0.0592) 
Constant 4.321** -0.0154 3.866** 
 (1.678) (2.928) (1.753) 
Hausman test p > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Year and State dummies YES YES YES 
Number of States 31 31 31 
Number of Observations 492 485 490 
R-squared 0.914 0.914 0.915 
Method Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
                  Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I.2a: Tourist Arrivals, Total, International and National (1990-2010):  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
Arrivals: 
Total 
Arrivals: 
Foreign 
Arrivals: 
National 
LDV (log) t-1  0.669*** 0.643*** 0.714*** 
 
(0.0406) (0.0611) (0.0373) 
Homicide (log)  -0.107* -0.219*** -0.102* 
 
(0.0583) (0.0821) (0.0575) 
Price level   -0.020 -0.057 -0.033 
 
(0.0293) (0.0598) (0.0254) 
State per Capita GDP (log) -0.285 0.409 -0.229 
 
(0.336) (0.667) (0.345) 
Urbanization 0.042*** 0.067** 0.041*** 
 
(0.0165) (0.0262) (0.0128) 
Storms -0.029 -0.026 -0.0239 
 
(0.0405) (0.0659) (0.0439) 
Roads (log) 0.057 0.053 0.071 
 (0.130) (0.287) (0.129) 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Number of States 31 31 31 
Number of Observations 492 485 490 
Method LSDV LSDV LSDV 
                  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table I.3a: Tourist Arrivals, Total, International and National (1990-2010):  
Fixed Effects 2SLS estimations (Instruments: Illiteracy rate and Imprisonment rate due to homicide) 
  (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (3) (3a) 
Variables 
Total  
Arrivals  
First stage 
regression 
Foreign 
Arrivals 
First stage 
regression 
National 
Arrivals 
First stage 
regression 
  
Homicide 
(log)  
Homicide 
(log)    
Homicide 
(log) 
Dependent Variable- (log) t-1  0.572*** -0.071 0.548*** -0.07** 0.616*** -0.068 
 
(0.0443) (0.0488) (0.0478) (0.0307) (0.0492) (0.0500) 
Homicide (log)   -0.251***  -0.305*  -0.242***  
 
(0.0802)  (0.1821)  (0.0787)  
Illiteracy  0.15***  0.15***  0.145*** 
  (0.0303)  (0.0308)  (0.0301) 
Imprisonment rate  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.004*** 
  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Price level   -0.022 -0.020 -0.06 -0.017 -0.035** -0.020 
 
(0.0198) (0.0237) (0.0397) (0.0244) (0.0174) (0.0248) 
State per Capita GDP (log) -0.239 -0.068 0.583 0.026 -0.238 -0.056 
 
(0.2622) (0.4996) (0.4862) (0.4845) (0.2490) (0.4937) 
Urbanization 0.040*** 0.04* 0.060*** 0.041** 0.038*** 0.040* 
 
(0.0112) (0.0204) (0.0219) (0.0199) (0.0101) (0.0205) 
Storms -0.032 -0.009 -0.035 -0.007 -0.024 -0.009 
 
(0.0320) (0.0317) (0.0606) (0.0326) (0.0340) (0.0326) 
Roads (log) 0.020 0.060 0.008 0.0589 0.027 0.057 
 (0.0600) (0.0926) (0.1758) (0.0927) (0.0551) (0.0950) 
F-statistic   22.43  21.61  22.09 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.8486  0.4525  0.8801 
Kleibergen Paap LM test  11.7  11.11  11.21 
Endogeneity test (p-value)  0.1075  0.6083  0.1098 
Year and State dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of Observations 489 489 482 482 487 487 
R-squared 0.6312 0.5825 0.4529 0.5879 0.6736 0.5797 
Method FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS 
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
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Table I.4: Tourist Arrivals, Total, International and National (1990-2010):  
Dynamic bias corrected estimator  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
Arrivals: 
Total 
Arrivals: 
Foreign 
Arrivals: 
National 
LDV (log) t-1  0.665*** 0.570*** 0.723*** 
 
(0.0510) (0.0455) (0.0520) 
Homicide (log) (fitted values)
 26
  -0.179* -0.288* -0.173* 
 
(0.0995) (0.172) (0.0952) 
Price level   -0.0336 -0.0510 -0.0406 
 
(0.0306) (0.0543) (0.0285) 
State per Capita GDP (log) 0.188 0.626 0.179 
 
(0.439) (0.732) (0.369) 
Urbanization 0.0329 0.0635** 0.0359** 
 
(0.0212) (0.0282) (0.0176) 
Storms -0.0275 -0.0309 -0.0308 
 
(0.0601) (0.0929) (0.0519) 
Roads (log) 0.0142 -0.0743 0.0346 
 (0.159) (0.265) (0.146) 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Number of States 31 31 31 
Number of Observations 494 489 491 
Method LSDV LSDV LSDV 
                   Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 The fitted values of the potentially endogenous variable Homicide (log) are taken from the first stage regression 
from the 2SLS estimation.   
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Appendix I.2: Mexican States 
 
Aguascalientes Distrito Federal Morelos Sinaloa 
Baja California Durango Nayarit Sonora 
Baja California Sur Estado de México Nuevo León Tabasco 
Campeche Guanajuato Oaxaca Tamaulipas 
Chiapas Guerrero Puebla Tlaxcala 
Chihuahua Hidalgo Querétaro  Veracruz 
Coahuila Jalisco Quintana Roo Yucatán 
Colima Michoacán San Luis Potosí Zacatecas 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Tourist Arrivals (Total) log 14.15577 1.098107 7.233455 16.31798 589 
Tourist Arrivals (Total) log  t-1 14.13433 1.107204 7.233455 16.31798 562 
Tourist Arrivals (International) log 12.00465 1.668351 5.826 15.62604 586 
Tourist Arrivals (International) log t-1 12.00123 1.675661 5.826 15.62604 559 
Tourist Arrivals (National) log  13.92622     1.072491    6.952729     16.0395 588 
Tourist Arrivals (National) log t-1 13.90193     1.080445    6.952729    16.02846 561 
Homicides  (log) 5.382426     1.150092    2.484907    8.737774 672 
Price Level 57.02784 27.58268 10.48747 98.55759 637 
State per Capita GDP (log) 4.146175 .513901    3.386864    6.176142 672 
Urbanization 72.61502     14.94279    39.45287    99.76386 672 
Storms  .1622024 .368911 0.00 1.00 672 
Roads (log) 8.883446     .6622945    7.247081    10.16591 651 
Illiteracy Rate 9.54375 5.673183 2.1 29.20 640 
Imprisonment Rate 46.57406 39.92938 0.00 247.8261 665 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Appendix I.4: Data Definitions and Sources 
 
 
 
Variables Definitions and data sources 
Total Tourist Arrivals 
The logarithm of total number of tourist arrivals in state i in year t. The data were 
obtained from Statistical Yearbooks of each Mexican state and Mexico City provided by 
INEGI.  
International Tourist 
Arrivals 
The logarithm of international number of tourist arrivals in state i in year t. The data 
were obtained from Statistical Yearbooks of each Mexican state and Mexico City 
provided by INEGI. 
National Tourist 
Arrivals 
The logarithm of national number of tourist arrivals in state i in year t. The data were 
obtained from Statistical Yearbooks of each Mexican state and Mexico City provided by 
INEGI. 
Homicides 
The logarithm of total number of homicides committed in state in year t. The data were 
obtained from the Mortality Statistics provided by INEGI. This data is available from 
1990 till 2010. 
Urbanization  
Share of the total population living in urban areas in state i in year t. The data were own 
construction based on the information data from the population censuses 1990, 2000, 
2010 and population counting 1995, 2005 provided by INEGI. 
Price Level  
Price level of the main cities in each state and Mexico City. The data were obtained 
from the Mexican Central Bank. The period is 1990 till 2010. 
State per Capita GDP (log) 
Own calculation using data on each State GDP and Population in each State. Values are 
in Mexican pesos, constant prices 2003. The data on State GDP are form the National 
Accounting System and the Population data are from the population censuses 1990, 
2000, 2010 and population counting 1995, 2005. All data are provided by INEGI. 
Storms 
A dummy variable which takes the value of one if a hurricane hit in state i in year t and 
zero otherwise. The data are from the Meteorological National Service and the Institute 
of Engineering at the National Autonomous University (UNAM) in Mexico City. 
Roads 
The logarithm of the number of kilometres of highways and paved roads in state i in 
year t. The data are from the Ministry of Transport and Communication (SCT Mexico). 
Illiteracy Rate 
Illiteracy rate of population older than 15 years. Data are provided by the Mexican 
Education Ministry. 
Imprisonment Rate 
Rate of imprisonment of people who have committed homicide. Data provided by 
INEGI. 
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Figure I.1 
0 8'000,0002'000,000 4'000,000 6'000,000
Zacatecas
Yucatán
Veracruz
Tlaxcala
Tamaulipas
Tabasco
Sonora
Sinaloa
San Luis Potosí
Quintana Roo
Querétaro
Puebla
Oaxaca
Nuevo León
Nayarit
Morelos
Michoacán
Jalisco
Hidalgo
Guerrero
Guanajuato
Estado de México
Durango
Distrito Federal
Colima
Coahuila
Chihuahua
Chiapas
Campeche
Baja California Sur
Baja California
Aguascalientes
Total Tourists Arrivals (1990-2010)
 
 
Figure I.2  
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Figure I.3 
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Figure I.4 
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Figure I.5 
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Figure I.A Note: Lineal regression of Total Tourist Arrivals on Homicides. 
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Figure I.B Note: Lineal regression of International Tourist Arrivals on Homicides. 
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Figure I.C Note: Lineal regression of National Tourist Arrivals on Homicides. 
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II.1 INTRODUCTION 
The resemblance between many contemporary civil wars over access to natural resources and the 
‘drug wars’ in Mexico is striking. However, while some scholars have noted the similarities 
between factors explaining armed conflict and violent crime (e.g., Neumayer 2003: 619) the two 
phenomena are usually studied separately. This paper addresses the issue of violent youth crime 
in Mexico employing a theoretical framework, the ‘opportunity perspective’, which has been a 
dominating narrative in the civil war literature. This framework emphasizes structural factors 
providing opportunities for rebel organizations to engage in insurgencies against a state, such as 
large youth cohorts or ‘youth bulges’, as well as other factors that determine economic 
opportunities for the youth like education and unemployment. In the political violence literature 
it has been noted that ‘youth bulges’ have historically been associated with times of political 
crisis and upheaval (Goldstone 1991, 2001) and it has generally been observed that young males 
are the main protagonists of criminal (Neapolitan 1997: 92, Neumayer 2003: 621) as well as 
political (Mesquida and Wiener 1996, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000: 253, Urdal 2006) violence. 
Generally, the increasing acknowledgement of the role of demographic factors in shaping 
conflict and international political developments is underscored by recent contributions in the 
field of political demography (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2012).  
Studies of violent crime, in particular studies of homicide rates, have long employed cross-
national time-series research designs. Most of these cross-national studies have included few 
developing countries, however. A much-cited homicide study, Fajnzylber et al. (2002), included 
only 39 countries, of which the minority were developing countries, citing the problems with low 
data availability for developing countries as well as underreporting. Underreporting, the authors 
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argue, should not be considered random noise, but measurement error that is systematically 
correlated with factors assumed to affect crime rates (Fajnzylber et al. 2002: 14). 
Furthermore, while sub-national panel studies have become prominent in the civil war 
literature (e.g. Buhaug and Rød 2006, Urdal, 2008, Østby et al. 2011, Vadlamannati 2011), 
similar studies of sub-national violent crime outside the US and a few other developed countries 
are rare. An exception is Dreze and Khera’s (2000) study of homicide across Indian states. By 
assessing variation in violent crime within Mexico over time, this study is less prone to reporting 
errors as such that stem from cross-national differences in data collection and reporting 
procedures, although we acknowledge several possible sources of bias. Furthermore, the 
subnational focus enables the use of data sources - in particular youth unemployment - that are 
not available for a large number of countries, and may thus not be used in cross-national studies.  
Mexico provides an ideal case for testing propositions about the significance of youth 
opportunities for violent crime. Demographically, Mexico is a relatively young country with the 
majority of its population falling into the age range of 12 to 29 years. The period of study, 1997-
2010, covers a time of significant youth population growth in Mexico. According to the Mexican 
Institute of the Youth the Mexican youth population aged 12-29 increased by 40.6% between 
1990 and 2000.
27
 While the overall growth in youth population is slowing down, regional 
differences in growth rates still exist due to migration and geographic fertility differentials. 
Detailed demographic, social and crime data further allow us to use econometric methods to 
consider how large youth cohorts in the context of limited education and employment 
opportunities affect violent crime.  
  
 
                                                          
27
 Instituto Mexicano de la Juventud, (Mexican Youth Institute, 2008). 
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This study adds to the existing literature in several ways. The article identifies and discusses 
youth opportunities and their potential implications for violent youth crime, and tests these 
propositions empirically in one of the first sub-national studies of violent crime in a developing 
country. It is further the first study to look at youth bulges and violence, either political or 
criminal, in the context of both education and employment, a unique opportunity granted by the 
rare availability of such data for Mexican states. Our results suggest that while youth crime and 
high homicide rates in Mexico are not associated with the ebb and flow of the male youth 
population, both high youth unemployment and low youth education are associated with higher 
levels of crime and homicide. And in this context, the relative size of the male youth population 
does matter. We also report additional results of some significance. In particular, there is an 
increasing concern that rapid urban population growth around the globe could lead to increasing 
levels of criminal as well as political violence. While this study finds some support for urban 
environments being generally more conducive to violent crime in Mexico, the pace of growth in 
the urban population does not appear to be associated with crime levels.   
 
II.2 THEORY 
The literature on youth bulges and violence has in particular focused on the role of large youth 
cohorts in facilitating spontaneous and low-intensity political violence. Two different 
explanatory frameworks have primarily informed the discussion, one focusing on opportunities 
and the other on motives for political conflict. The opportunity framework is particularly relevant 
for explaining criminal violence, and has a parallel expression in the literature on violent crime 
(Neapolitan 1997). Neumayer (2003) notes that opportunity theory ‘tries to understand variation 
in violent crime rates in terms of different opportunities or favorable conditions for committing 
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crime’. Fajnzylber et al. (2002: 1-2), basing their approach primarily on Gary Becker’s 
opportunity framework, contend that ‘crime rates depend on the risks and penalties associated 
with apprehension and also on the difference between the potential gains from crime and the 
associated opportunity cost’.28 
 
II.2.1 Youth bulges and violent crime  
The opportunity literature, often referred to as the ‘greed’ perspective (e.g. Collier 2000), has its 
roots in economic theory and focuses on structural conditions that provide opportunities for an 
organization to engage in violent activity, whether a rebel group that wages war against a 
government, or a criminal organization. These are conditions that provide the organization with 
financial means, such as rents from drug trafficking, or factors that reduce the costs of operation, 
such as low recruitment costs. Relatively large youth cohorts can reduce the recruitment costs for 
insurgent groups through the abundant supply of ‘rebel labor’ with low opportunity cost, 
increasing the risk of armed conflict (Collier 2000: 94). Similarly, large youth bulges may 
facilitate recruitment to criminal organizations. Opportunities for violence may be further 
boosted by a weak government with limited capabilities (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004).  
Central assumptions in the opportunity perspective are that organizational structures that may 
be used for illegal purposes, whether political or criminal, exist exogenously, and that recruits 
join these organizations in order to obtain a private good. Hence, the collective action problem is 
presumed to be negligible. Criminal organizations or rebel groups are able to recruit successfully 
only when the potential gain from joining is so high and the expected costs so low that potential 
                                                          
28
 Arguably, violent crime may also be driven by feelings of disadvantage or unfairness (Fajnzylber et al. 2002: 2) as 
emphasized in motive-oriented or relative deprivation studies. However, it is empirically difficult to distinguish 
between these two types of explanations since they yield largely identical predictions (Urdal 2006). 
57 
 
recruits will favor joining over alternative income earning opportunities. Collier (2000: 94) 
argues that the mere existence of an extraordinary large pool of youth is a factor that lowers the 
cost of recruitment since the opportunity cost for a young person generally is low. Hence, our 
base expectation is that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In regions with large youth populations relative to the adult population, violent 
crime rates are higher, everything else being equal. 
 
However, Hirschi and Travis (1983) argue that age in itself is an insufficient explanation for 
violence, and that shifting attention towards the meaning or interpretation of the relationship is 
required. Hence, in the following we consider two factors that are key determinants of youth 
opportunities: educational attainment and youth unemployment. 
 
II.2.2 Educational opportunities and violent crime 
Education is a tool that countries can exploit in order to respond to youth bulges and ease 
transition problems. But do expanding education opportunities reduce the risk of criminal 
violence? Collier (2000) argues that higher levels of education among men act to reduce the risk 
of political violence, resulting from the higher opportunity cost of rebellion for educated men. 
Since educated men have better income-earning opportunities than the uneducated, they have 
more to loose and we would expect them to be less likely to join a criminal organization.  
Hence, a high level of education is expected to be associated with a reduced risk of violence. 
While for criminal ‘entrepreneurs’, a high level of education may in fact lead to higher rewards if 
it enables more efficient management of illicit activities (Barakat and Urdal 2009), the argument 
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that recruitment of youth to criminal activity is economically less attractive the more highly 
educated a person is refers to mass participation. In areas with large potential pools of recruits, 
increasing education can act to reduce this pool. Although the argument that education increases 
the opportunity cost of youth takes a general form, we focus here on secondary education for 
young males since they are the primary target for recruitment to criminal organizations. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In regions with low secondary male education levels, violent crime rates are 
higher, everything else being equal. 
 
II.2.3 Youth unemployment and violent crime 
The expectation that exceptionally large youth cohorts increase the supply of cheap recruits for 
criminal enterprises is further supported by studies in economic demography suggesting that the 
alternative cost of individuals belonging to larger youth cohorts are generally lower compared to 
members of smaller cohorts due to higher unemployment and thus increased pressure on male 
wages. According to the ‘cohort size’ hypothesis, ‘other things being constant, the economic and 
social fortunes of a cohort (those born in a given year) tend to vary inversely with its relative 
size’ (Easterlin 1987, quoted in Machunovich 2000: 236). Increases in relative cohort size 
arguably result in a reduction in male relative income. Such a direct relationship has been found 
in several studies using wage data for smaller samples of countries (reviewed in Machunovich 
2000: 238). In two cross-national time-series analyses, Machunovich (2000) finds that an 
increase in relative cohort size is associated with a reduction in fertility, arguably resulting from 
the depression of male wages while Korenman and Neumark (1997) find that large youth cohorts 
are associated with a significant increase in youth unemployment rates. So not only do youth 
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bulges provide an unusually high supply of individuals with low opportunity cost, as anticipated 
by Collier (2000), but an individual belonging to a relatively large youth cohort generally also 
has a lower opportunity cost relative to a young person born into a smaller cohort. While labor 
markets differ substantially with regard to flexibility, also within countries, empirical evidence 
suggests that on average, large youth cohorts are substantially more likely to experience higher 
unemployment rates (Korenman and Neumark 1997).  
While previous studies have identified a theoretical link between youth unemployment and 
violence, the lack of reliable data for many developing countries has made a direct test of this 
relationship for large samples of countries difficult. Several studies have instead tried to assess 
the relationship indirectly by looking at economic growth as youth unemployment is typically 
associated with poor economic performance. Low economic growth has been identified as a 
robust predictor of both homicide (Neumayer, 2003) and civil war onset (Collier et al. 2003, 
Sambanis 2002: 229).  Here, we address the relationship explicitly, expecting that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: In regions with large unemployment among young males, crime rates are higher, 
everything else being equal. 
 
Finally, we consider the possible effect on violent crime of the interaction of factors leading 
to low opportunities for youth. Given the expectations that low education and high 
unemployment among male youth should be associated with increased levels of violent crime, 
we would further expect that high unemployment in low-education male strata should be 
particularly strongly associated with violence, and that the economic opportunities for this group 
of males may be particularly limited in the context of large male youth bulges.  
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Hypothesis 4: The association between large youth cohorts and violent crime is particularly 
strong in regions where education levels are low and unemployment rates among young men are 
high, everything else being equal. 
 
II.2.4 Existing research 
Previous studies have found mixed evidence for a relationship between age structure, or ‘youth 
bulges’, and violent crime. Hansmann and Quigley (1982) and Pampel and Gartner (1995) both 
find a significant effect of the age structure on homicide rates in cross-national studies, while 
Gartner and Parker (1990) find a strong age structure effect on homicide in two (US and Italy) 
out of five countries, acknowledging that differential patterns within countries may still have 
affected internal variation in homicide in the remaining three countries. On the hand, Avison and 
Loring (1986), Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Neumayer (2003), Cole and Gramajo (2009), and 
Pridemore (2011) do not find statistically significant effects of age structure on crime in country-
level panel data analyses. In a meta-analysis of cross-national homicide studies, Nivette (2011) 
reports that static population indicators were among the group of variables that exerted the 
weakest effect on homicide. Fox and Hoelscher (2012) find some initial and strong support for 
the youth bulge hypothesis, although the relationship washes away once controlling for 
socioeconomic factors. A possible reservation here is that introducing socioeconomic variables 
also reduces the sample considerably. However, both Fox and Hoelscher’s (2012) results as well 
as Neumayer’s (2003) finding that economic growth reduces homicides, point to the salience of 
socioeconomic factors. Hence, what we should be looking for are conditional factors determining 
youth opportunities.  
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There appears to be somewhat stronger, albeit by no means unequivocal, evidence for a link 
between education and violent crime. Cole and Gramajo (2009) find that male education reduces 
homicide, Fajnzylber et al. (2002) conclude that higher education levels are associated with less 
homicide, while Dreze and Khera (2000) found that higher literacy levels moderated criminal 
violence levels in India. However, some results appear more puzzling: Cole and Gramajo (2009) 
found that higher female education was associated with higher homicide levels, while Fajnzylber 
et al. (2002) unexpectedly found that higher education was associated with higher levels of 
robbery. Furthermore, Pridemore (2011) report inconclusive results with regards to education, 
while Robbins and Pettinicchio (2012) only found weak support for the assumed beneficial effect 
of social capital on homicide. Only two of the surveyed studies include unemployment. Pampel 
and Gartner (1995) did not find a significant effect of unemployment, while Neumayer (2005) 
reports that unemployment increases levels of both robbery and homicide. 
In the civil war literature there has been a certain discussion about the measurement of age 
structure (Urdal 2006, Barakat and Urdal 2009). Like two authoritative civil war studies by 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), most of the studies above employ 
suboptimal measures of age structure. The measure typically used is the 15 to 24 (or 29) year old 
cohorts relative to the total population, including all cohorts under the age of 15 years in the 
denominator. Such definition is highly problematic both theoretically and empirically. First, most 
theories about youth revolt and crime assume that violence arises because youth cohorts 
experience institutional ‘bottlenecks’ in the education system or in the labor market due to their 
larger size compared to previous cohorts.  Second, when using the total population in the 
denominator, youth bulges in countries with continued high fertility will be underestimated 
because the large under-15 populations deflate the youth bulge measure. At the same time, 
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countries with declining fertility and relatively smaller under-15 populations – which are in a 
position to experience economic growth driven by age structural change which may be expected 
to contribute to reduce both criminal and political – score relatively higher. The issue of 
measurement appears not to have been discussed in the homicide literature, with the lone 
exception of Fox and Hoelscher (2012). 
 
II.3 DATA AND METHOD  
In this section, we describe the data covering all 32 Mexican states, including the Federal district, 
also known as Mexico City (see Appendix II.1 for details) during the 1997–2010 period, and the 
estimation specifications. The base specification is shown below. 
 
II.3.1 Estimation Specification 
The baseline specification estimates the number of crime incidents committed by the youth 
( itYC ), in state i in year t as a function of a set of youth opportunity variables 1itYE ,
 and control 
variables
1it
Z :  
 
)1(
11 titiititit
ZYEYC  
  
 
where i  denotes state fixed effects to control for unobserved state specific heterogeneity in the 
panel dataset, t are time specific dummies and ti is the error term. Note that the Hausman 
(1978) test favours fixed effect over random effect models. For the dependent variable we use 
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the number of federal crimes committed by Mexican males in the age cohort 18–2429 in state i in 
Mexico in year t-1 in per capita terms logged. These data are reported by the National Institute 
for Statistics and Geography
30
 (INEGI hereafter) for the 32 states (including the Federal district) 
for the 1997 through 2010 period (INEGI 2012). Federal crimes include all counts of drug-
related crime and other violent organized criminal activity, but exclude ‘common crime’, 
providing for an appropriate proxy for violent crime to be tested specifically against youth 
opportunities (see Appendix II.4 for details). Figure II.1 shows the number of youth federal 
crime incidents reported across Mexican states during the 1997–2010 period. The states with the 
highest number of youth federal crimes are Baja California, Sonora, Jalisco, Federal District, 
Chihuahua and Sinaloa, many of which are heavily affected by drug-related violence.  
Our main independent variables in the vector of youth opportunity in equation (1) are: male 
youth bulge, male youth education attainment rate, and male youth unemployment rate. We 
define the male youth bulge as 18–24 year old males as a share of all males aged 18 years and 
above, capturing the dynamics in the younger working-age segments.
31
 The demographic data is 
taken from Mexican population censuses carried out by INEGI across all the 32 Mexican states 
(including the Federal District) once every 10 years. Once every five years INEGI also conducts 
random surveys known as population count. Thus, the data used to construct the youth bulge 
come from the censuses of 1990, 2000, and 2010 (INEGI, 1990; 2000; 2010), and from the 
population surveys of 1995 and 2005 (INEGI, 1995; 2005). The youth education variable also 
originates from the census data, as well as the 2005 survey. This variable measures the 
                                                          
29
 A crime is included if at least one of the reported suspects is a male between the ages of 18 and 24. For more 
details about categories and definitions of federal crimes in Mexico, see Appendix 4 and www.inegi.org.mx 
(Estadísticas Judiciales en Materia Penal). 
30
 See: www.inegi.org.mx/ for more details about INEGI 
31
 We have also used the conventional (Urdal 2006) definition of youth bulges measuring 15–24 year old males as a 
share of male population aged 15 years and above. Our results remain unchanged when we use this alternative 
measure of youth bulge.  
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proportion of men aged 18-24 years with at least completed secondary education normalized by 
the total male population aged 18-24 years. Youth unemployment is defined as the number of 
males aged 18-24 years who are reportedly unemployed divided by the total male labor force 
aged 18-24 years. The unemployment and labor force data are available from the Mexican 
census files for 1990, 2000 and 2010 only (INEGI, 1990; 2000; 2010). Missing years between 
the reported census and survey observations for the aforementioned variables are interpolated. 
This is defendable given that demographic and education variables normally change relatively 
slowly. We do acknowledge, however, that unemployment figures are likely to be much more 
volatile, and that the interpolation between the census observations is likely to miss some 
variation. While this is unfortunate, unemployment data based on census records are clearly 
preferable to less reliable survey data, in particular given our aim to study age-, gender-, and 
education-specific unemployment across all Mexican states over time.
32
  
We further disaggregate the youth unemployment data by the category of education, 
constructing data that as far as we know have not previously been used to test the youth 
opportunity and violence nexus. We specifically use unemployment rate in low education and 
high education strata respectively in our subsequent specification (2): 
 
)2(
111 titiitititit
ZURhighYURlowYYC  
  
 
Where, 
1it
URlowY  denotes the unemployment rate in low education stratum, while 
1it
URhighY  denotes the unemployment rate in high education stratum in state i and year t-1 
respectively. We first collapse the categories for ‘no’, ‘primary’ and ‘incomplete secondary’ 
education into the low education stratum, defined as those males aged 18-24 years with lower 
                                                          
32
 As a robustness check, we have also used an alternative definition of youth measured as the male population 
between the 18-30 years, also constructing education and unemployment rates for this group. 
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education than completed secondary level. We then divide the number of men who are 
unemployed in this category by the total male population aged 18-24 with low education. Note 
that data on employment by education are available only from the 1990, 2000 and 2010 
population censuses. Likewise, we categorise male youth in the high education stratum as those 
aged 18-24 who have obtained completed secondary schooling or higher (including tertiary 
education). We then construct a measure for the unemployment rate in the high education 
stratum by dividing the unemployed male youth with high education by the total male population 
with high education in the age group of 18-24 years.  
We further examine under what conditions the youth bulge can be associated with an increase 
in youth crimes using specification (3) below: 
 
)3(
)()(
1
11111
titiit
itititititit
Z
YBURhighYURlowYYBURhighYYBURlowYYC






 
Where 
1
)(

 itYBURlowY denotes the unemployment rate in low the education stratum 
interacted with the youth bulge and 
1
)(

 itYBURhighY is the interaction between the 
unemployment rate in the low education stratum and the youth bulge in state i and year t-1. 
These interactions help examine whether the effect of youth bulges on violent crime are 
conditional upon the unemployment rates in low vis-à-vis high education strata.
 
Finally, the vector of control variables (Zit-1) includes other potential determinants of (log) 
youth crime incidents per capita in state i during year t-1 which we include based on the extant 
literature on the subject. Here we follow earlier studies by Barakat and Urdal (2009), 
Demombynes and Ozler (2005), Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002), Hashimoto (1987) 
Miron (2001), and Urdal (2006). Accordingly, we include state per capita GDP (logged) in US$ 
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2003 constant prices
33
 and the rate of growth of state GDP in i during year t-1 to proxy for the 
level of development in states. The income data are available from the National Accounts 
System of INEGI.
34
 Likewise, we also use state population which is drawn from the population 
census data compiled by INEGI. We further compute two urban population measures, 
urbanization measuring urban population as a share of total population in state i during year t-1 
and the rate of growth of the urban population. Urdal and Hoelscher (2012) point out that 
managing urban development sustainability pose significant challenges for the respective 
governments and therefore large youth bulge in urban centres could be a source of instability and 
violence. We then include a measure of state governor elections. We follow Schneider (2013) to 
generate an indicator for the timing of elections that varies between 0 and 1. For all non-election 
years, the value is 0. For election years we make use of the following measure: (12 − (Mn − 
1))/12, wherein Mn is the month in which the state Governor election took place. The data on the 
exact date and month in which the elections are held in each state are obtained from the state 
elections results and information published by the Institute of Marketing and Opinion (Instituto 
de Mercadotecnia y Opinión 2012). Accordingly, for election years this indicator takes smaller 
values the later the election takes place within the year.
35
 The details on variable definitions and 
data sources are reported in Appendix 3. We estimate all our models with Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS henceforth) two-way fixed effects estimator with heteroskedasticity consistent 
robust standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).
36
 
 
                                                          
33
 The data of state per capita GDP were available only in Mexican pesos 2003 constant prices. We use the exchange 
rate to US$ to convert these data into US$. 
34
 For more details see: www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/SCN/C_Anuales/pib_ef/default.aspx 
35
 The results remain quantitatively the same if we use a dummy for the governor election years.  
36
 The fixed-effects estimator captures factors such as geographic location of states, which are also expected to affect 
the level of criminal violence. 
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II.3.2 Endogeneity concerns 
It is quite possible that our key explanatory variables capturing youth opportunity are 
endogenous. That is, it might be that criminal activities attract more youth with low alternative 
cost towards areas with high crime rates, and especially towards drug-related activities which 
might maximize their returns in the short run. This could affect the education and unemployment 
measures. It could also be that high levels of crime deter local investments, driving up 
unemployment levels. Although the cause for reverse causality is indirect and presumably 
relatively weak, not taking this endogeneity into account might induce bias in our estimates of 
the effect of youth opportunity and violent crime. We control for this problem by replicating the 
OLS fixed effects models using the system-GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The results are based on the 
two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2006) in Stata 12. We also apply the Hansen test 
to check the validity of the instruments used and the Arellano-Bond test of second order 
autocorrelation, which must be absent from the data in order for the estimator to be consistent. 
We treat the lagged dependent variable (i.e., youth federal crime per capita logged) and our 
measures of youth opportunity in all models as endogenous and the rest of the variables as 
exogenous. In all our system-GMM regression models we include time dummies. In order to 
minimize the number of instruments in the regressions, we follow Roodman (2006) and collapse 
the matrix of instruments.  
 
II.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Table II.1 presents the baseline results estimated using specification (1) capturing the effects of 
the youth bulge, youth education and youth unemployment rate on youth crime incidents. In 
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Table II.2 estimating specification (2), we disaggregate the youth unemployment rate by 
category of education, i.e., separating between unemployment in the low and high education 
strata. In Table 3, we estimate specification (3) by introducing the interaction between the 
unemployment rate by education and the youth bulge. Finally in Table II.4, we replace the two 
youth unemployment measures by education with a measure, ‘Density of Low-Opportunity Cost 
Youth’, capturing the overall ‘density’ of unemployed male youth with low education as a 
percentage of all male youth. In all the four tables we estimate our models with OLS fixed 
effects followed by system-GMM to address potential endogeneity concerns. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Appendix II.2. Beginning with Column 1 in Table II.1, the results show 
that our crude measure for the male youth bulge actually has a negative association with youth 
crime, and this relationship is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. These results do 
not lend support to those who attribute crimes committed by the youth in Mexico to surge in the 
youth bulge. However, this effect does not remain statistically significant when we introduce a 
lagged dependent variable in Column 2. We retain the lagged dependent variable hereafter in all 
our models. In all tables reported here, the lagged dependent variable remains significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. In Column 3 we introduce the youth unemployment rate 
which is positive, but statistically insignificant. In Column 4, we also include the youth 
education attainment ratio, finding, as expected, that higher levels of education have a strong 
negative effect on youth crime. The finding is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Holding other controls at their mean, an increase in youth education by one unit is associated 
with 0.2% less youth crime incidents. Both the unemployment rate and the youth bulge variables 
remain statistically insignificant once controlling for youth education. In the last column, 
Column 5, we re-estimate the results with system-GMM. While the results remain similar to 
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Column 4, the youth unemployment rate becomes marginally significant at the 10% level. These 
results however do not provide clear cut evidence on the effect of youth unemployment and 
education on youth crime. We therefore disaggregate the unemployment levels among youth by 
low and high education in Table II.2. 
As can be seen in Column 1 Table II.2, we find a positive and significant effect of the youth 
unemployment rate in the low education stratum, statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Holding all other variables constant, a standard deviation increase in the youth unemployment 
rate in the low education stratum is associated with a 0.6% increase in youth crime incidents per 
head, which is about 4% of the standard deviation of youth crime incidents per head. However, 
we do not find any statistical significance when we replace this measure with one that estimates 
unemployment in the high education stratum in Column 2 (Table II.2). These results broadly 
support our hypothesis that the opportunity cost of engaging in violent crimes is higher among 
young men in the high education stratum. We re-estimate these models using system-GMM, 
presented in Columns 3–4 in Table II.2. The results are upheld when using system-GMM, with 
the effect of the youth unemployment rate in the low education stratum on violent crime 
remaining statistically significant at the 10% level. The youth unemployment rate in the high 
education stratum remains statistically insignificant. The Hansen and the Arellano-Bond tests do 
not reject the GMM specifications at conventional levels of significance across Columns 3–4. 
The Hansen J-Statistic further shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments 
cannot be rejected at the conventional level of significance.  
In Table II.3 we turn our attention to the interaction effects between youth bulge and the 
unemployment rate by education category. First, in Column 1 we interact the youth bulge and the 
unemployment rate in the low education stratum, and in Column 2 we interact them in the high 
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education stratum. As can be seen in Column 1, we find that the interaction between the youth 
bulge and unemployment in the low education stratum has a positive effect in explaining the 
youth crime incidents per head, and that the term is significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.
37
 This effectively means that states with a higher percentage of male youth in their 
populations are more vulnerable to youth crime incidents if the unemployment rate among the 
low education stratum increases. In other words, a youth bulge is not a problem in itself, rather 
the risk of violence is conditional upon higher levels of youth with low education and thus scant 
employment opportunities. To better understand how the marginal effect of the youth bulge 
interacted with the unemployment rate in the low education stratum develops, we illustrate this 
graphically in Figure II.3. This graph shows the development of the marginal plot of the youth 
bulge variable interacted with unemployment rate in the low education stratum on youth crime 
incidents per head. Basically, the marginal plot has an upward direction. This implies that youth 
bulges increase violent crime if the youth unemployment rate in the low education stratum 
increases. The marginal effect gains statistical significance after the youth unemployment rate in 
the low education stratum reaches the median score of 3.5%, meaning that the positive effect is 
found in states with an unemployment rate among low education stratum higher than 3.5%. In 
other words, youth bulges are associated with higher levels of federal crimes in states where the 
youth unemployment rate in the low education stratum is increasing. The three terms are jointly 
highly significant (p< 0.0004).  
We now turn to the interaction between the youth bulge and the unemployment rate in the 
high education stratum in Column 2. The interaction effect is not significantly different from 
zero. This suggests that larger youth bulges do not appear to increase the risk of violent youth 
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 The youth bulge variable alone has a negative effect in explaining youth crime incidents and interestingly, we now 
find that unemployment in the low education stratum also has a negative sign. This is largely due to a high 
correlation (0.96) with the interaction term. 
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crime even when the unemployment rate in the high education stratum is increasing. As 
discussed above, this suggests the opportunity costs of engaging in crime are exuberantly higher 
for the unemployed youth in the high education stratum. We also replicate these results using 
system-GMM reported in Columns 3–4 in Table II.3. As can be seen, the interaction effect 
results remain robust to using system-GMM. It is noteworthy that after controlling for potential 
endogeneity, the statistical significance of the interaction of the youth bulge with the 
unemployment rate in the low education stratum drops to the 10% level. The Hansen J-Statistic 
in all the three columns shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments cannot 
be rejected at conventional levels of significance. 
Lastly, in Table II.4, we use a variable, ‘Density of Low-Opportunity Cost Youth’, capturing 
the overall ‘density’ of unemployed male youth aged 18-24 with low education measured as the 
share of the total male youth population in that age group. We restrict our specification to only 
include unemployment in the low education stratum since the relative number of unemployed 
youth with low education is the quantity of greatest theoretical relevance to the opportunity 
perspective. As can be seen, the density of unemployed youth with low education is positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% levels in OLS fixed effects and System-GMM 
estimations respectively (Columns 1 and 2). In Columns 3 and 4 we interact the youth bulge with 
the density variable. As can be seen, the interaction effect is positive and significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels of significance in both the OLS and GMM estimations. In fact, 
the marginal effect gains statistical significance after the youth unemployment density in the low 
education stratum reaches the median score of around 2.3% (figure not shown). These results 
show that irrespective of whether we use the measure for the unemployment rate or density, 
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unemployment in the low education stratum is the best predictor of youth crime indents in 
Mexico.  
Before moving further towards robustness checks, we will briefly discuss the results of the 
control variables. Interestingly, we do not find any robust evidence for an impact on violent 
youth crime of both per capita state GDP, the rate of growth of state GDP, and state population. 
Likewise, after controlling for fixed effects we don’t find any effect of urban population growth 
on youth crime, hence increasing urban population pressure does not seem to increase violent 
crime. However, like others, we do find a strong positive effect on youth crime of the level of 
urbanization, which is consistent with the idea that urban environments are more conducive to 
violent crime (e.g., Urdal and Hoelscher 2012). The variable capturing the timing of elections is 
associated with fewer number of crime incidents during the run-up towards governor elections. 
This might be due to two reasons. First, there is every possibility of under reporting of crime 
incidents during the run-up towards elections by the incumbent government.
38
 Second, it is also 
plausible that the incumbent governor would impose measures aimed at reducing violence during 
the election period, signalling to voters her/his commitment to control crime and restore law and 
order. We also cannot rule out the possibility that the result is driven by a combination of the two 
factors.  
 
II.4.1 Robustness checks 
We have examined the robustness of our main findings in the following ways. First, we used 
alternative measures for the youth bulge, youth unemployment, and education variables. 
Departing from the measure of 18–24 year old men, we used 18–30 year old men as a share of all 
men aged 18 years and above. We also computed the federal crime incidents registered under the 
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 For details on state elections see: imocorp.com.mx/CAMPO/zSIEM/ELEC_X_ANIO/ResultadosWeb.asp 
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age group of 18–30 years. Likewise, we also used the 18-30 age group to compute the 
unemployment rate by category of education. Using our alternative measures does not alter our 
results significantly. We still find that the unemployment rate in the low education stratum 
matters most. The results for the interaction between the youth bulge and the unemployment rate 
in the low education stratum remain robust. Second, we re-estimated our OLS fixed effects 
models with negative binomial models where we used the dependent variable as an event count 
of youth federal crime incidents in the male 18-24 year category. We also control for time and 
state specific dummies. The results estimated using negative binomial method remains 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables II.1–II.4, estimated using the OLS fixed effects 
approach. The unemployment rate in the low education stratum remains positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level across all the negative binomial estimations. 
Third, in some of our OLS fixed effects models the Hausman test rejects fixed effects. Thus, we 
estimate all the models using random effects. The results remain robust to using random effects 
instead of fixed effects. Fourth, we also estimate our OLS baseline results using the Newey-West 
method which allows us to compute an AR1 process for autocorrelation and obtain Huber-White 
corrected robust standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity (Newey and West 1987). 
Replacing the OLS estimation method with Newey-West does not alter the baseline estimations. 
Fifth, as an additional test for robustness, we exclude the few observations with extreme values 
in youth crime incidents reported.
39
 Excluding outliers, the baseline results are qualitatively 
unchanged, suggesting that our results are not driven by extreme values.  
Finally, we have also examined the effects of youth opportunities on homicide rates across 
Mexican states. Unfortunately, reliable age-specific perpetrator data for homicides are not 
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 We use ‘avplot’ in Stata 12 to identify the outliers in youth federal crime incidents. 
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available.
40
 We use homicides per 100,000 population logged as the alternative dependent 
variable. The data are collected by INEGI on an annual basis and available for all the 32 states in 
Mexico from 1990 to 2010.
 41
 Compared to the youth crime incident data, the homicide data may 
not be as vulnerable to underreporting as they appear to be consistently reported across states. 
The results for the homicide models generally uphold our baseline results reported in Tables II.1 
and II.2, i.e. the unemployment rate in the low education stratum contributes to explain variation 
in homicide rates after controlling for relevant socio-economic factors. However, it is noteworthy 
that we could not replicate the results on the interaction between youth bulge and unemployment 
rate in the low education stratum as reported in Table II.3. The results of these robustness checks 
are not reported due to brevity, but they are available upon request. 
 
II.5 CONCLUSION 
This article investigates potential causes for the variation in violent youth crime across Mexican 
states, with a particular focus on the role of youth opportunities. Building on an ‘opportunity 
framework’ prominent both in the civil war and criminology literatures, we initially 
hypothesized that violent crime should vary with demographic age structure, so that states with 
large ‘youth bulges’ should have higher levels of violent crime, ‘everything else being equal’. 
This expectation is not borne out by the empirical models, however, as our measure for the male 
youth bulge is consistently negatively associated with violent crime rates. We further 
hypothesized that the two factors that arguably most strongly determine the actual opportunity 
                                                          
40
 Note that the available age specific data for homicides show several shortcomings. For instance, they do not  show 
variation in some years for some states. Furthermore, there is a sudden drop and jump in several years for most of 
the states. Therefore, we rather use the data coming directly from the mortality statistics (which doesn’t provide 
homicides by age groups). 
41
 For details on mortality statistics see: 
www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/proyectos/continuas/vitales/bd/mortalidad/anexos/introduccion.asp?s=est
&c=11142. 
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cost for youth, levels of education and employment, should be associated with crime levels, and 
particularly so when low education levels and high unemployment levels occur in states with 
large male youth bulges. These much more specific expectations regarding youth opportunities 
are not easily tested for global cross-national samples due to data limitations. The availability of 
reliable and comparable census data for Mexico, providing age and gender-specific educational 
attainment and unemployment rates at the state level, allow for a detailed sub-national panel 
study of youth opportunities and violent crime. Our empirical models, also taking into account 
possible confounding factors and endogeneity, find strong support for the importance of youth 
opportunities. This pertains in particular to educational attainment as our models consistently 
find low levels of education to be strong predictors of high levels of violent crime. We further 
find that high unemployment among men with low education is clearly associated with higher 
crime rates, and that this effect is amplified by an interaction with large male youth bulges. No 
similar effect is found for high unemployment among men with higher education levels, 
suggesting that the higher opportunity cost of youth with at least completed secondary education 
may serve as a barrier against recruitment to criminal organizations. This study provides some 
crucial insights into the complex root causes for the high levels of violent crime in Mexico. 
While being a mid-income country with relatively well developed institutions, Mexico is 
experiencing a de facto lack of territorial control over certain geographical areas to drug cartels, 
and levels of violence that vastly surpass most contemporary armed conflicts. As such, 
improving knowledge of structural factors determining violent crime and ultimately building 
increased capacity to reduce crime will improve not only the situation for the Mexican 
population, but also the general security situation of the greater region. Furthermore, the findings 
reported here may have implications for understanding the drivers of violent crime beyond the 
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Mexican context, and incite more detailed data collection and empirical study of youth 
opportunities and violence elsewhere. The developmental consequences of political and criminal 
violence are vast (World Bank, 2011) and to this end, failing to invest in human capital among 
young people may represent a double development challenge. 
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Table II.1: Effect of youth bulge and youth opportunity on youth crime  
Dependent variable: Federal youth crime incidents per capita (log) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE SGMM 
Constant -15.35*** -10.75*** -9.995*** -11.91*** -2.098** 
 
(3.485) (3.627) (3.815) (3.777) (0.956) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
0.357*** 0.345*** 0.331*** 0.400*** 
  
(0.0572) (0.0564) (0.0560) (0.0915) 
State Per capita GDP (log) t-1 0.654** 0.546* 0.397 0.515 -0.126 
 
(0.329) (0.306) (0.339) (0.333) (0.0902) 
State GDP growth t-1 -0.00303 -0.00554 -0.00405 -0.00450 -0.00841* 
 
(0.00509) (0.00462) (0.00473) (0.00466) (0.00486) 
State Population t-1 8.06e-08 4.70e-08 5.27e-08 3.96e-08 -7.95e-08*** 
 
(5.11e-08) (5.07e-08) (5.06e-08) (4.80e-08) (2.51e-08) 
Urbanization t-1 0.0339*** 0.0202* 0.0204* 0.0291** 0.0164*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.00582) 
Rate of Urbanization t-1 0.0428 0.0317 0.0246 0.0275 0.126** 
 
(0.0364) (0.0358) (0.0366) (0.0362) (0.0495) 
Timing of State Governor Elections -0.0875** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.168*** 
 
(0.0397) (0.0359) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361) 
Male Youth Bulge t-1 -0.120** -0.0789 -0.0714 -0.0307 -0.114* 
 
(0.0556) (0.0531) (0.0531) (0.0524) (0.0643) 
Male Youth Unemployment Rate t-1 
  
0.0393 0.0345 0.0730* 
   
(0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0409) 
Male Youth Secondary School Attainment t-1 
   
-0.0230** -0.0508*** 
    
(0.0100) (0.0150) 
R-squared 0.906 0.919 0.919 0.921   
Hausman test (p-value) 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2): p-value  
    
0.21 
Hansen Statistic (p-value) 
    
0.20 
Number of Instruments 
    
29 
State specific dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES NO 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations 448 448 448 448 448 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results in bold reflect 
relationships that are central to the theoretical argument (main independent variables). 
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Table II.2: Effect of youth unemployment rate by education category on youth crime  
Dependent variable: Federal youth crime incidents per capita (log) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS-FE OLS-FE SGMM SGMM 
Constant -9.665** -10.23*** 5.052 27.53** 
 
(3.829) (3.845) (13.68) (12.41) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.340*** 0.350*** 0.656*** 0.0221 
 
(0.0563) (0.0564) (0.130) (0.324) 
State Per capita GDP (log) t-1 0.357 0.453 -0.434 -1.847*** 
 
(0.336) (0.342) (0.771) (0.699) 
State GDP growth t-1 -0.00324 -0.00468 -0.0154** 0.00195 
 
(0.00470) (0.00472) (0.00747) (0.0114) 
State Population t-1 5.47e-08 5.11e-08 -3.47e-08 -2.16e-07** 
 
(5.04e-08) (5.05e-08) (5.53e-08) (9.05e-08) 
Urbanization t-1 0.0203* 0.0198* 0.00298 0.0276*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.00794) (0.00774) 
Rate of Urbanization t-1 0.0248 0.0274 0.232 0.0471 
 
(0.0360) (0.0368) (0.159) (0.159) 
Timing of State Governor Elections -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.165*** -0.148*** 
 
(0.0361) (0.0360) (0.0392) (0.0379) 
Male Youth Bulge t-1 -0.0748 -0.0750 -0.323 -1.111*** 
 
(0.0533) (0.0530) (0.393) (0.382) 
Youth Unemployment Rate in Low Education Stratum (Males) t-1 0.0498* 
 
0.338* 
 
 
(0.0282) 
 
(0.191) 
 Youth Unemployment Rate in High Education Stratum (Males) t-1 
 
0.0234 
 
0.137 
  
(0.0295) 
 
(0.242) 
R-squared 0.920 0.919     
Hausman test (p-value) 
    Arellano-Bond test for AR(2): p-value  
  
0.36 0.34 
Hansen Statistic (p-value) 
  
0.99 0.99 
Number of Instruments 
  
51 51 
State specific dummies YES YES YES NO 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Observations 448 448 448 448 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results in bold reflect 
relationships that are central to the theoretical argument (main independent variables). 
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Table II.3: Effect of youth unemployment rate by education category on youth crime  
Dependent variable: Federal youth crime incidents per capita (log) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS-FE OLS-FE SGMM SGMM 
Constant -9.913*** -9.994*** -7.351 -1.121 
 
(3.686) (3.819) (6.051) (4.403) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.337*** 0.348*** 0.163 0.353 
 
(0.0546) (0.0567) (0.381) (0.427) 
State Per capita GDP (log) t-1 0.691* 0.546 0.151 -0.0337 
 
(0.359) (0.349) (0.302) (0.287) 
State GDP growth t-1 -0.00506 -0.00506 -0.00350 -0.00717 
 
(0.00458) (0.00467) (0.00746) (0.00841) 
State Population t-1 3.72e-08 4.62e-08 -9.95e-08** -7.58e-08 
 
(5.08e-08) (5.04e-08) (4.88e-08) (5.65e-08) 
Urbanization t-1 0.00995 0.0158 0.0149* 0.0109 
 
(0.0122) (0.0123) (0.00829) (0.00876) 
Rate of Urbanization t-1 0.0245 0.0299 -0.0430 0.0478 
 
(0.0357) (0.0372) (0.0932) (0.109) 
Timing of State Governor Elections -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.100** -0.136*** 
 
(0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0507) (0.0496) 
Male Youth Bulge t-1 -0.161** -0.110* -0.105 -0.266* 
 
(0.0632) (0.0623) (0.128) (0.147) 
Unemployment Rate in Low Education Stratum (Males) t-1 -0.581** 
 
-0.772 
 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.483) 
 Unemployment Rate in Low Education Stratum (Males) t-1 × Youth Bulge t-1 0.0301** 
 
0.0380* 
 
 
(0.0124) 
 
(0.0220) 
 Unemployment Rate in High Education Stratum (Males) t-1 
 
-0.178 
 
-0.797 
  
(0.210) 
 
(0.673) 
Unemployment Rate in High Education Stratum (Males) t-1 × Youth Bulge t-1 
 
0.00979 
 
0.0418 
  
(0.0100) 
 
(0.0338) 
R-squared 0.922 0.919     
Hausman test (p-value) 
    Arellano-Bond test for AR(2): p-value  
  
0.40 0.84 
Hansen Statistic (p-value) 
  
1.00 1.00 
Number of Instruments 
  
60 60 
State specific dummies YES YES YES NO 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Observations 448 448 448 448 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results in bold reflect 
relationships that are central to the theoretical argument (main independent variables). 
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Table II.4: Effect of the density of low-opportunity cost youth on youth crime  
Dependent variable: Federal youth crime incidents per capita (log) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS-FE SGMM OLS-FE SGMM 
Constant -9.144** -3.054* -10.71*** -0.157 
 
(3.803) (1.587) (3.718) (2.357) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.336*** 0.533*** 0.342*** 0.701*** 
 
(0.0564) (0.202) (0.0518) (0.185) 
State Per capita GDP (log) t-1 0.342 -0.00818 0.700** 0.0431 
 
(0.324) (0.0574) (0.345) (0.0387) 
State GDP growth t-1 -0.00289 -0.0103** -0.00343 -0.0104** 
 
(0.00481) (0.00492) (0.00468) (0.00491) 
State Population t-1 5.73e-08 -4.92e-08* 2.34e-08 -2.99e-08* 
 
(5.08e-08) (2.52e-08) (5.21e-08) (1.73e-08) 
Urbanization t-1 0.0188 0.00840* 0.0199* 0.00530** 
 
(0.0119) (0.00434) (0.0120) (0.00232) 
Rate of Urbanization t-1 0.0254 0.0745* -0.00202 0.0543* 
 
(0.0360) (0.0424) (0.0345) (0.0300) 
Timing of State Governor Elections -0.116*** -0.161*** -0.116*** -0.202*** 
 
(0.0359) (0.0460) (0.0367) (0.0522) 
Male Youth Bulge t-1 -0.0909* -0.0969* -0.160*** -0.174** 
 
(0.0547) (0.0527) (0.0566) (0.0711) 
Density of Low-Opportunity Cost Youth (Males) t-1  0.178** 0.188* -2.266*** -2.827* 
 
(0.0788) (0.116) (0.801) (1.666) 
Density of Low-Opportunity Cost Youth (Males) t-1 × Youth Bulge t-1 
  
0.116*** 0.146* 
   
(0.0373) (0.0774) 
R-squared 0.920   0.923   
Hausman test (p-value) 0.20 
 
0.00 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2): p-value  
 
0.21 
 
0.15 
Hansen Statistic (p-value) 
 
0.20 
 
0.12 
Number of Instruments 
 
28 
 
31 
State specific dummies YES NO YES NO 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Observations 448 448 448 448 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results in bold reflect 
relationships that are central to the theoretical argument (main independent variables). 
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Figure II.1 
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Figure II.2 
 
Note: Lineal regression of Youth Crime Incidents on Youth Unemployment Rate in Low Education 
Stratum. 
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Figure II.3 
Note: Youth bulges increase violent crime if the youth unemployment rate in the low education stratum 
increases. The positive effect is found in states with an unemployment rate in the low education stratum 
higher than 3.5%. 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix II.1: Mexican States 
 
Aguascalientes Distrito Federal Morelos Sinaloa 
Baja California Durango Nayarit Sonora 
Baja California Sur Estado de México Nuevo León Tabasco 
Campeche Guanajuato Oaxaca Tamaulipas 
Chiapas Guerrero Puebla Tlaxcala 
Chihuahua Hidalgo Querétaro  Veracruz 
Coahuila Jalisco Quintana Roo Yucatán 
Colima Michoacán San Luis Potosí Zacatecas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Youth Crime Incidents (Male) 182.15 216.31 1.00 1921.00 553 
Homicides (Number of cases) 407.69 546.50 1.00 6234.00 672 
State Per capita GDP (log) t-1 9.06 0.68 7.76 11.96 640 
State GDP Growth t-1 3.03 4.21 -13.41 15.77 608 
State Population t-1 3014547 2608974 317764 15000000 640 
Urbanization t-1 72.53 14.95 39.45 99.76 640 
Rate of Urbanization t-1 2.31 1.28 0.24 11.00 608 
Timing of  Governor Elections 0.12 0.29 0.00 1.00 672 
Youth Bulge (Male) t-1 23.38 2.41 17.93 29.73 640 
Male Youth Unemployment Rate t-1 2.82 1.37 1.04 8.30 640 
Male Youth Secondary  School attainment t-1 30.38 4.29 18.95 39.22 640 
Unemployment Rate in Low Education Stratum (Males) t-1
42
 2.50 1.19 0.72 8.83 640 
Unemployment Rate in High Education Stratum (Males) t-1 3.09 1.42 1.21 8.38 640 
Density of Low-Opportunity Cost Youth (Males) t-1 1.02 0.43 0.36 2.84 640 
 
 
                                                          
42
 The lack of unemployment insurance explains the relatively low Mexican unemployment rate in general and 
among the youth. The high informal employment is still a policy challenge in Mexico (OECD 2012). 
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Appendix II.3: Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables Definitions and data sources 
Youth Federal Crimes 
Total number of federal crimes committed by young males in the cohort 18-24 and 
18-30 in state i in year t. The data were obtained from the Penal Judicial Statistics 
provided by INEGI. The log of this variable is used in the OLS and System-GMM 
models. 
Homicides 
Total number of homicides in state i in year t. The data were obtained from the 
Mortality Statistics provided by INEGI. The variable used is Homicide per 100,000 
inhabitants logged. 
Youth Bulge (male) 
Males in the cohort 18-24 as a share of all males aged 18 years above. The same 
definition applies when we expand the cohort to 18-30. The data are from the 1990, 
2000 and 2010 population censuses, and from the 1995 and 2005 population surveys 
carried out by INEGI. 
Youth Unemployment 
(male) 
Own construction using the number of males under the age group of 18-24 years 
who are reportedly unemployed divided by the total male labor force under the age 
group of 18-24 years. The unemployment and labor force data are made available 
from the population censuses of INEGI. The same definition applies when we 
expand the cohort to 18-30. 
Youth Education (male) 
Own construction using the total number of males under the age group of 18-24 
years with completed secondary education normalised by the total male population 
under the age group of 18-24 years. The data on youth secondary schooling 
attainment is available from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 population censuses, and 
from the 2005 population survey. All data are from INEGI. 
Unemployment rate in 
low education stratum 
youth (male) 
Own construction using the number of males under the age group 18-24 years who 
are unemployed and have low or no education (  incomplete primary school, primary 
school only, and incomplete secondary school) divided by the male population under 
the age group 18-24 years with low education. The data is available from the 1990, 
2000, and 2010 population censuses carried out by INEGI. The same definition 
applies when we expand the cohort to 18-30.  
Unemployment rate in 
high education stratum 
youth (male) 
Own construction using the number of males under the age group 18-24 years who 
are unemployed and have high education (at least completed secondary school) 
divided by the male population under the age group 18-24 years with high 
education. The data is available from the 1990, 2000 and 2010 population census 
carried out by INEGI. The same definition applies when we expand the cohort to 18-
30.  
Urbanization 
Share of the total population living in urban areas in state i in year t-1. The data was 
own construction based on the information data from the population censuses 1990, 
2000, 2010 and population surveys 1995, 2005 provided by INEGI. 
Urbanization Rate 
Growth rate of the share of people living in urban areas areas in state i in year t-1. 
The data is based on information from the 1990, 2000, 2010 population censuses, 
and  the1995 and 2005 population surveys provided by INEGI. 
Timing of Governor  
Elections 
Indicator for the timing of state level Governor elections that varies between 0 and 1. 
It takes smaller values the later the election takes place within the calendar year of 
the election year and is 0 for all other years. We follow Schneider (2013) and make 
use of the following measure: (12 − (Mn − 1))/12, wherein Mn is the month in 
which the state Governor election took place. The data on the exact date on which 
the elections are held in each state are obtained from the state elections results and 
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information published by Institute of Marketing and Opinion (IMO) in Jalisco, 
Mexico. 
State per capita GDP (log) 
Own calculation using data on state-level GDP and population. Values are in U.S. 
dollars, constant prices 2003. The data on State GDP are form the National 
Accounting System and the population data are from the 1990, 2000, 2010 
population censuses, and population surveys 1995, 2005. All data are provided by 
INEGI. 
State GDP Growth 
Rate of growth of each State GDP. The data on State GDP are from the National 
Accounting System and are provided by INEGI. 
Population 
Population of each State and the Federal District. All data are from the 1990, 2000, 
2010 population censuses, and the 1995 and 2005 population surveys done by 
INEGI. 
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Appendix II.4: Collection and categorization of the federal crime data 
The criminal procedure system in Mexico classifies crimes to be recorded under two broad 
categories namely, federal crimes and common crimes. The federal crimes include criminal 
activities associated with drug violence and other forms of organized crime; homicide; blocking 
of roads; possession, use and sale of weapons; piracy; illegal migrant and other human 
trafficking; falsification of documents; and kidnapping. Common crimes on the other hand 
include such crimes as sexual harassment; stealing of animal livestock; property expropriation; 
theft; rape; and domestic violence. While federal crimes are prosecuted in Mexico under the 
Federal Penal Code, the common crimes are adjudicated under the Penal Code of the respective 
states in which the offence took place.
43
 The focus of this study is federal crimes only, which are 
typically associated with large-scale organized crime.  
The criminal procedure system in Mexico specifies that when a crime incident occurs the 
investigative agencies decide whether the particular crime committed falls under the category of 
federal or common crime. If the crime is identified as a federal crime, the agents of the Federal 
Public Ministry together with the judiciary police start a preliminary investigation into the 
incident. The incident is then and there recorded as a federal crime. The investigative agencies 
are then required to investigate the crime, and maintain detailed records of the progress of the 
investigation. During such investigation, they may question or arrest any suspects. Based on the 
preliminary investigation and evidence gathered, the agencies decide to either approach the 
judiciary court or dismiss the case (typically due to lack of sufficient evidence against the 
suspect(s)). If the investigative agencies decide to approach the judiciary court, all arrested 
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 On December 2
nd
, 2012, the incoming Mexican President together with the two principal opposition political 
parties PAN and PRD, signed a document called “Pact for Mexico” as a part of larger judiciary reforms. One of the 
main features of this pact included the introduction of a single Penal Code and a single Penal Procedures Code for 
the entire country. 
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individuals must be produced before a judiciary court and charged with a specific federal crime 
within 48 hours of the decision, or be released. The investigative agencies must submit a report 
to the judge which details the results of the investigation. Based on this report, the judge makes a 
decision about whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding with a criminal case. If s/he 
so rules, a formal ruling is announced, detailing the offence with which the accused is charged. If 
the judge on the other hand concludes that the report from the investigative agencies does not 
provide sufficient reasons to frame a charge, the case is dismissed. Our dependent variable 
captures the number of incidents at the state level recorded as federal crimes for which at least 
one young male aged 18-24 is suspected of the crime, and has been arrested.  
The state level crime data are collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 
(The National Institute for Statistics and Geography, INEGI). INEGI was formed in 1983 as a 
part of Ministry of Finance. In 2005, it was separated from the Ministry of Finance and became 
an autonomous institution. Its main task is to conduct regular population and economic censuses 
across Mexican states and municipalities. INEGI also collect and process all forms of crime data 
on a monthly basis based on input from the courts at the state level. Through its website, it 
provides data on crime incidents by suspected perpetrators for different age groups, from 1990 to 
2010. The reported categories changed somewhat between 2008 and 2009. For both periods, 
there is a distinction between the “register year” and the “occurrence year”. The former 
represents the year in which a crime was registered by the court of justice and the latter records 
the year in which the crime actually took place. The count based on ‘register year’ includes 
crimes dating back before 1990, hence we have relied on the ‘occurrence year’ data only. For 
this category we observed a sudden jump in crime figures across all age groups in 1997, and 
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assume that data prior to 1997 has been subject to significant under-reporting.
44
 Therefore, we 
only consider crime data starting in 1997.  
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 While data prior to 1997 appears to be significantly under-reported, INEGI recognizes that not every crime is 
reported, hence there could be a bias due to under-reporting for the period covered by this analysis (Síntesis 
Metodológica. Estadísticas Judiciales en Materia Penal, p. 6). However, we have no information suggesting that 
such underreporting could systematically bias the relationships that we are studying. Furthermore, systematic time 
period or geographical biases should in principle be picked up by the time and state specific dummy variables 
respectively.   
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Chapter III 
 
13 Years Later: The Spread of Drug Crime in Mexico 
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III.1 INTRODUCTION  
Drug trafficking in Mexico is nothing new, nor are the deterrent policies implemented by the 
local authorities. As documented in Camp (1992), Toro (1995), Turbiville (1997), Flores Pérez 
(2009) and Moloeznik (2009) over the last thirty years Mexican authorities have relied heavily 
on the armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking by deploying troops for crop eradication, 
drug seizures and other counter-narcotics operations. This deterrence strategy accelerated greatly 
during the Fox and Calderón administrations.
45
 As is well documented, by the end of 2006 and 
start of 2007 the Mexican federal government initiated an unprecedented frontal fight against the 
criminal organizations operating across the Mexican territory. Following this deployment, 
violence started to become one of the main concerns for Mexican society and authorities. The 
severity of this situation caused several scholars to start to analyze why Mexico became so 
violent. For instance, Rios (2012) argues that the main source of violence in the country stems 
from both drug trafficking organizations (henceforth DTO´s) fighting each other for the control 
of the drug market routes to the United States and authorities fighting the DTO´s using the police 
and military. According to Ríos (2012), in the short run an uprising of violence is expected 
which is predicted to decline in the long run. In the long run only the strongest DTOs would 
survive this turmoil.  
This strategy has been largely criticized by scholars, the media, prominent personalities such 
as former U.N. General Secretary Koffi Annan, as well as NGOs in Mexico and abroad who 
question whether it was the best strategy available to authorities (HRW 2012, 2013). 
These critics argue that by solely implementing deterrent policies violent crime would not 
stop. Rather, they claim that as a result of these policies drug-related conflicts spread to regions 
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This corresponds to the 2000-2006 period for the Fox administration and to the 2006 to 2012 period for the 
Calderón administration. 
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which were previously unaffected. Within the literature on the economics of crime, geographical 
space has gained importance since crime in general is affected not only by local factors but also 
by the characteristics of neighboring areas (Ratcliffe, 2010). Thus, it might be the case that one 
deterrence policy could represent a gain to one region but a cost to another by displacing 
criminal offenders to other regions. 
Some authors have sought to explain changes in overall crime levels. For instance, Klann 
(2012) investigates the effect of drug enforcement on overall crime levels in Mexico for the 
1998-2008 period. However, no assessment exists to date which analyses whether drug crime has 
spread throughout Mexico and whether this spillover effect is caused by the deterrent measures 
of the Mexican authorities. To fill this gap in the literature, I collect data specifically on drug 
crimes at the state level for the 1997-2010 period for the 31 Mexican federal states and Mexico 
City. Assessing whether drug crime in Mexico shows any spillover effect from one region to 
another is important in terms of public security policy planning and police force coordination. 
Applying spatial econometrics techniques, this paper empirically investigates whether drug 
related crime in a given Mexican state shows a diffusion effect to the neighboring states and 
whether there is a spillover or contagion effect from one state to its neighbors. I find a positive 
and significant effect of a diffusion of drug crimes after controlling for political and socio-
economic characteristics of regions. These findings take into account the endogeneity inherent to 
the spatial autoregression implementing 2SLS estimation and are robust to the selection of the 
spatial lag weighting matrix. Furthermore, I find weak evidence of a spillover effect of drug 
crime as a response to the authorities’ deterrence measures.    
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature and 
develops the hypotheses of the paper. Section 3 discusses the data and identification strategy, and 
the empirical results. Section 4 presents robustness checks and section 5 concludes.  
III.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Following the seminal work by Becker (1968) the literature on economics of crime has mainly 
attempted to determine its empirical validity. A large body of this research examines deterrence 
which is the idea that crime can be reduced by increasing the expected cost to felons of 
committing a crime. In particular, this research focuses on arrest and incarceration rates, policing 
levels and harsh punishments like death penalty.
46
 Parallel to this research, there is an array of 
literature considering hypotheses derived from economic models. These hypotheses include, for 
instance the roles of gun laws, guns, drug prohibition, and abortion legalization in causing 
crime.
47
 
Additional to the previous research, there is a growing strand of literature concerned within 
the field of crime economics that highlights the importance of local geography as a determinant 
of crime, (Andresen 2006; Ratcliffe 2010). The underlying idea is that crime in one region is 
partly influenced by crime in a neighboring region. For example, a drug gang may sell drugs in 
one area and their presence may influence the growth of a drug market in a neighboring location. 
Similarly, the crime deterrence policies implemented by the authorities in one region might have 
implications for its neighboring regions. In this sense, Tabarrock and Helland (2009) examine 
whether harsher laws in California contribute to the displacement of criminals from that location 
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 Dezhbakhsh et al. 2006; Webster et al. 2006; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004; Kuziemko and Levitt 2004; 
Shepherd 2004; Dezhbakhsh et al. 2003; Mocan et al 2006; Mocan et al 2003; Katz et al 2003; McCrary, J. 2002; 
Kessler 1999;  Levitt 1996; Levitt 1997; Ehrlich 1996; Moody and Marvell 1996; Ehrlich 1975; Ehrlich 1977. 
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 Dobkin and Nicosia 2009; Levitt 2004; Plassmann et al 2003, Donohue and Levitt 2008;  Donohue and Levitt 
2004; Donohue and Levitt 2001; Foote and Goetz 2008; Grogger and Willis 2000; Joyce 2003; Joyce 2009; Miron 
2001; Miron 1999; Levitt 1997. 
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to other states in the U.S. They find that these types of laws do not generate significant criminal 
spillovers.  
Arguably, there might be different types of crime and it is right to ask whether the type of 
crime affects the rate or presence of spillover. Thus, disaggregating crime into murders, thefts, 
frauds and squeezes, Cracolici and Uberti (2008) explore the spatial structure and distribution of 
crime in Italian provinces for the years 1999 and 2003 and find some evidence of spatial 
spillover in four areas of crime. Cohen and Tita (1999) use spatial econometric techniques to 
analyze whether homicides in the city of Pittsburg exhibit a contagion effect across 
neighborhoods during the 1991 to 1995 period. They do find contagious diffusion between 
neighborhoods. 
What is more, Buonanno et al. (2011) not only analyze whether crime shows a diffusion effect 
from one region to another but they also provide evidence that social sanctions represent a very 
strong deterrent to a specific type of crime: property crime. They develop an exogenous and 
reliable measure for the density of social interactions and by implementing spatial panel model 
GMM estimation for all 103 Italian provinces during the period 1996-2003 they find that areas 
with denser social interactions display significantly and substantially lower rates of property 
crime. Further examples of articles applying spatial econometric techniques to understand the 
crime phenomenon are Cahill and Mulligan (2007), Fotheringham et al. (2002), Andresen 
(2006), Martin (2002) and Mencken and Barnett (1999). 
Within this body of literature, spatial econometrics studies on crime-related topics in Latin 
American and in particular in Mexico are scare. Dills et al. (2010) mention that this limitation is 
in part due to the scarcity of crime statistics and data on its possible determinants for countries 
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other than the U.S. One such prominent study by Formisano (2002) applies spatial econometrics 
techniques to a cross section of 563 neighborhoods in Bogota, Colombia, for the year 1999 in 
order to investigate the spatial diffusion of homicides. He finds that, on average, the rate of 
homicides in one neighborhood spreads by 14% to surrounding neighborhoods. Extending the 
study period from 1995 to 2000 also reveals a contagion effect of 56% of homicides to the 
neighboring localities. A further finding is that homicides in Bogota are highly concentrated in a 
few zones, which are home to criminal groups and known drug selling locations.   
III.2.1 Drug Crime in Mexico  
Astorga (2009) documents that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations date back to the early 
twentieth century, when U.S. and worldwide laws began to prohibit the production, distribution, 
and consumption of alcohol and psychotropic substances. At that time Mexico was a low-level 
supplier of drugs and Mexican smugglers mainly trafficked in homegrown marihuana and 
opiates grown in areas that remain important production zones today. Since the year 1929 the 
country was ruled by the political party PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) till the year 2000. 
During these seven decades there was a type of peaceful operation of drug trafficking in Mexico 
since powerful traffickers and PRI government officials maintained relatively predictable 
relationships (Morris 2012). Kenny and Serrano (2012) explain that the modern Mexican State 
and organized crime have a mutual evolution and thus it finds itself fighting parts of itself when 
fighting the criminals. Similarly, Morris (2012) argues that rampant corruption in Mexico makes 
it difficult at times to distinguish law violators from enforcers. Accordingly, Astorga (2007), 
Flores Pérez (2009) and Synder and Duran Martinez (2009) point out that the centralized power 
structure during the PRI ruling years was at the same time permissive and protective of 
organized criminal activities.  
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This mutual evolution of the state and organized crime shaped a remarkable underlying 
pattern of corruption in Mexico in the kind of a revolving door, whereby state security officials 
leave government service to work for the DTOs and DTOs members infiltrate and work within 
the government (Morris 2012).  
During the last three decades three broad changes altered the patterns and influence of 
corruption and its relation to drug trafficking and organized crime: Mexico´s political 
transformation (Morris 2012), changes within the drug trafficking sector itself manifested 
through the alliance between the Colombian and Mexican DTOs as a result of the U.S. 
government´s efforts to upset the Colombian supply chain through South Florida (Chabat 2002) 
and the confrontational policies of former President Calderón (Morris 2012). 
Mexico´s political transformation occurred with the dismantling of the PRI-led authoritarian 
regime during the last three decades and the control of state and local governments by opposition 
parties. The political change of this period weakened the informal rules of operation and old 
bargains. This left DTOs without the state sponsored protection they had once enjoyed and 
forced them to acquire their own means of protection and to create their own paramilitary 
structures (Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009). Consequently, drug crime in Mexico is the result 
of a complex system of different political economy players.  
Hence, my base expectation is that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the political and socio-economic conditions throughout regions in Mexico, 
drug crime spreads from one region to another, everything else being equal. 
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The literature about deterrence and crime contains mixed results. For instance, many studies find 
that increasing deterrence reduces crime.
48
 Decker and Kohfeld (1985) and Benson et al. (1994), 
however, suggest that while deterrence may reduce crime rates, it is more likely that arrests 
follow from an increase in crime as police reallocate enforcement resources to combat the 
increase in crime. Additionally, Cornwall and Trumbull (1994) find that labor market and 
criminal justice strategies are important in deterring crime, but that the effectiveness of law 
enforcement incentives has been greatly overstated. Tabarrok and Helland (2009) have shown 
that criminal sanctions in California displace criminals rather than deterring criminal activity; 
implying that a benefit to California represents a cost to other states.  
Similarly, it has also been documented that pressure placed on drug growers is not sufficient 
to reduce drug crop production significantly. For instance in Bolivia, enforcement efforts against 
producers and traffickers have brought down the price of coca leaves, leading to a slight drop in 
the amount of coca produced since 1989. On the contrary, in Peru, coca production increased 
between 1989 and 1992 by an amount equivalent to 73 percent of Bolivia´s reduction. It is 
feasible that one country`s success in reducing production will simply be another´s problem as 
criminals migrate to places of least resistance and most opportunity, creating demand for drug 
crop production. This phenomenon is referred to as the “balloon or spillover effect” in the 
literature. In other words, what is pushed down in one place simply springs up in another 
(UNRISD, 1994). However, it can also be the case that the measures implemented by the 
authorities in one country or region inhibit the activities of criminal organizations in such a way 
that crime incidents in the neighboring countries or regions are also reduced. 
For the case of Mexico, since December 2007 the federal Mexican authorities, by means of 
the federal police and the military implemented random checkpoints on highways throughout 
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  Levitt (1997, 1998), Lee and McCrary (2005), Klick and Tabarrol (2005), Evans and Owens (2007). 
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Mexico to hinder the flow of drugs from one state to another. Unfortunately there are no public 
records available which show the intensity and location of this deployment of federal forces.
49
  
However, with the available data, which will be explained in the next section, I test the 
hypothesis that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Deterrence measures from the authorities in state i could have either a negative 
or a positive impact on the level of drug crime incidents in the neighboring states. 
 
III.3 DATA AND METHOD  
This paper uses a panel dataset across 32 Mexican states (including the Federal district, also 
known as Mexico City) during the 1997–2010 period. The following specification estimates the 
change in the log of drug crimes ( itDCln ), in state i in year t as a function of a vector of control 
variables itZ  which are drawn from the existing literature and the drug crimes in other states in 
year t, a variable known in the literature as the spatial lag. 
)1(ln
titijt
ij
ijitit
DCZDC s   

 
Furthermore, i  denotes state-fixed-effects to control for unobserved state-specific heterogeneity 
in the panel dataset, t is a time-specific dummy and ti is the error term. For the dependent 
variable I use the log number of all sorts of crime events related to drugs: production, transport, 
trafficking, commerce and possession in each of the 31 Mexican states and the federal district. 
The use of panel data helps to eliminate spatial error dependence, which arises through spatial 
autocorrelation of omitted variables (Brueckner, 2003). 
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 According to the Mexican Secretary of Defense (SEDENA), the number and location of these check points in the 
Mexican highways is classified and not revealed to the public (SEDENA 2011). 
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The spatial lag, jt
ij
DCijs

 is the weighted sum of the inverse distance in kilometers from the 
capital city of each Mexican state and the Federal District to the other capital cities.
50
 The 
coefficient of the spatial lag depicts the degree to which changes in drug crimes in a given state 
are correlated with changes in the drugs crimes in its neighboring states, all else being equal. In 
other words, this variable captures the spillover effect of crime. That is, if a state experiences an 
increase in the level of crime in a given year, then the neighboring states should also experience 
increasing crime levels. From Figure III.1 and Figure III.3 it can be seen that the drug crimes in 
Mexico follow an upward trend from 1994, reach a peak in 2007 and fall thereafter. This 
coincides with the full-scale military campaign launched by former president Calderón’s 
administration against DTOs across Mexico. In order to test the second hypothesis, I use data on 
marihuana seizures collected from the Office of the General Prosecutor Attorney General as a 
proxy for drug control policy and construct a spatial lag variable. Similarly to the above, this 
spatial lag depicts the extent to which changes in marihuana seizures in a given state affect 
changes in the drug crimes in its neighboring states, all else being equal. This data registers the 
tons of marihuana seized by the authorities in each and every state for the period 1994 through 
2010. As can be seen from Figure III.2, the tons of marihuana seized show an upward trend 
previous to the year 2000 and from there onwards both ups and downs are frequent. 
Disentangling the data across states, Figure III.6 shows that the bulk of the tons of marihuana 
seized in the 1994-2010 period was in the states of Sinaloa, Sonora and Durango. The details of 
the variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix III.4.  
                                                          
50
 As in Blonigen and Davies (2004) I specify model in log-linear form because this model leads to well-behaved 
residuals given the skewness in the drug crime data. 
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Spatial econometric theory suggests that the weights used in the construction of the spatial lag 
should be declining in distance but it does not propose a specific form (Davies and Naughton 
2013). Basically, the specification of the weights is a matter of considerable discretion and the 
literature offers a wide range of suggestions (Anselin and Bera, 1998). I specify the spatial 
weights as:   
ij
ij d
s
1
  . 
 Setting sij  in this way gives less weight to the states which are further away from state i. The 
rationale for using the inverse distance as a weight has been documented in the economics of 
crime literature since crime in general is affected not only by local factors but also by the 
characteristics of neighboring areas. Thus, it might be the case that one policy could represent a 
gain to a region by displacing criminal offenders to other regions. In other words, the cost of a 
region represents the gain of another (Tabarrock and Helland, 2009).  
An issue of concern in the estimation of (1) pertains to the potential endogeneity of the drug 
crimes of other states. This is a problem which is inherent to spatial autoregression: itDC depends 
on jtDC  and jtDC  on itDC . In other words, there may be unobservable regional or national 
shocks which are correlated with the drug crimes of multiple states. However, even with the 
inclusion of time fixed effects, the issue of reverse causation and spatially correlated 
idiosyncratic shocks would still persist. Thus estimating equation (1) using OLS would provide 
biased estimates due to this endogeneity.  
According to Kelejian and Prucha (1998), instrumental variables estimation (IV) yields 
consistent estimates even in the presence of spatial error dependence (Saavedra, 2000; 
Brueckner, 2001). In order to instrument for the spatial lag, I implement a 2SLS estimation 
procedure. The instruments for the drug crime spatial lag are the weighted sums of the control 
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variables: log state per capita GDP; population; and the unemployment rate. To make this 
calculation I use the same weights as those used to calculate the spatial lag itself.   
)2(
titiitjt
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In the second stage, the fitted values of equation (2) are used in the estimation of equation (1) in 
place of jt
ij
ij
DCs

. The vector of control variables (Zit) includes other potential determinants of 
drug crime incidents (log) in state i during year t, which I obtain from the extant literature on the 
subject. This follows earlier studies by Buonanno, Pasini and Vanin (2011), Corman and Mocan 
(2005), Formisano (2002), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), Raphael, and Winter-Ebmer 
(2001) and Cornwall and Trumbull (1994). Accordingly, I include state per capita GDP (logged) 
in Mexican pesos $ 2003 constant prices to proxy for income. The income data are available 
from the National Accounts System of INEGI.
51
 Likewise, I use state population, which is drawn 
from the population census data compiled by INEGI. The Mexican population censuses are 
carried out by INEGI across all the 32 Mexican states (including the Federal District) once every 
10 years. Once every five years INEGI also conducts surveys known as population counts. Thus, 
the data used to interpolate the population variable comes from the censuses of 1990, 2000, and 
2010 (INEGI, 1990; 2000; 2010), and from the population surveys of 1995 and 2005 (INEGI, 
1995; 2005). Similarly, the Mexican census files for 1990, 2000 and 2010 only (INEGI, 1990; 
2000; 2010) and the population survey of 2005 (INEGI 2005) register interstate migration. The 
unemployment and labor force data are available from the Mexican census files for 1990, 2000 
and 2010 only (INEGI, 1990; 2000; 2010). The data on crime reporting agencies are taken from 
the Penal Judicial Statistics provided and published on an annual basis by INEGI. Additionally, I 
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include three political dummy variables which take the value of one if the state governor in state 
i during year t belonged to either one of the three governing political parties, PRI, PAN, PRD.
52
 
As is well documented, and mentioned above, for many decades Mexico had in place a highly 
centralized power structure which was permissive and protective of organized criminal activities 
(Astorga Almanza 2007; Flores Pérez 2009; Synder and Duran Martinez 2009). The data on the 
exact governing period for each of these political parties in each state are obtained from the 
information published by the Institute of Marketing and Opinion (Instituto de Mercadotecnia y 
Opinión 2012).  
 
III.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Column 1 of Table III.1 represents the baseline model in which only the spatial lag of drug 
crimes is considered together with control variables drawn from the literature. Column 2 includes 
the spatial lag of marihuana seizures and excludes the spatial lag for drug crimes. Columns 3 and 
4 consider both spatial lags but employ both different external instruments. For this first set of 
estimations I use the inverse distance of each of the capital of each state to all other capital cities 
as a weighting matrix. As introduced above, this allows me to give more weight to the drug 
crime incidents taking place in the neighboring states of state i. The weight of drugs crimes is 
thus decreasing with increased distance.
 
Turning to the coefficient of interest in Column 1 the results show a positive and significant 
spatial lag of drug crimes. Thus, keeping all other variables constant, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the drug crimes incidents from state i's neighboring states leads to an increase of 
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29.7
53
 percent in state i. This value is positive and significant at the 10% level. For this 
estimation I implement the spatial lags of GDP per capita logged, unemployment rate, population 
and crime reporting agencies of other states.  
As highlighted above, first, the spatial lag of the drug crimes is regressed on the spatial lags of 
GDP per capita logged, unemployment rate, population and crime reporting agencies of other 
states and all other regressors. In this way the predicted values of the spatial lag of drug crimes 
are obtained which then enter the second stage regression to obtain an unbiased estimator for the 
drug crime incidents variable. Staiger and Stock (1997) argue that in order to reject the null 
hypothesis that the selected instruments are not relevant, the first stage F-statistic should show a 
value larger than 10. As can be seen at the bottom of Table III.1, Column 1 the specification 
shows an F-statistic far above 10, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the selected instruments 
are not relevant. Furthermore, the Hansen J-statistic with a p-value of 0.18 shows that the null-
hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. Next, in 
Column 2, I account for the effect of drug control policy by including the spatial lag of 
marihuana seizures as a deterrence measure. The coefficient of this spatial lag shows a negative 
and significant coefficient at the 5% level. Again, for its interpretation I proceed in the same way 
as before. Thus, holding all other control variables constant, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the tons of marihuana seized in the neighboring states of state i leads to a reduction 
in drug crime incidents by 75.8%. This could be interpreted as a success of the drug control 
policy of the Mexican authorities. Since the dependent variable measures the drug crimes due to 
production, transport, trafficking, commerce and possession of drugs in state i at time t, the tons 
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 For the sake of interpretation of all results presented in this section, I perform the following calculation: 
100*)1( * SDe , where  is the estimated coefficient from each model and SD is one standard deviation from 
the estimated sample.  
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of marihuana seized in state i at time t exert variation in the drug crimes incidents variable.
54
 
Thus, I exclude the marihuana seizures variable in state i at time t in the second specification.
55
 
Again, the F-statistic provides support for the relevance of external instruments and the Hansen 
J-statistic with a p-value of 0.87 shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected 
at conventional levels of significance. 
Column 3 considers both spatial lags, namely for drug crime incidents and for marihuana 
seizures. By doing so, I intend to control for the spillover of crime when drug enforcement 
operations are being carried out. Although the coefficient on the spatial lag of drug crime 
incidents shows a positive and significant coefficient and an F statistic above the threshold level 
of 10, the Hansen J-statistic does not render support for the exogeneity of the set of external 
instruments used, - the spatial lags of GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population and crime 
reporting agencies per capita. Consequently and based on the results of the first stage estimation, 
I exclude the spatial lag of the GDP per capita and again perform the 2SLS estimation with the 
remaining external instruments. The results of this estimation are shown in Column 4.  
In this case, holding all other controls constant, a one standard deviation increase in drug 
crime incidents in the neighboring states to state i at time t leads to an increase of drug crime 
incidents of 80% in state i at time t. Contrary to the previous estimation in Column 3, the F-
statistic now shows a value above 10 for both of the spatial lags, which provides support for the 
relevance of the external instruments and the Hansen J-statistic with p-value of 0.86 exhibits 
support for their exogeneity. This result shows a higher spillover effect of drug crime from one 
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 Arguably, marihuana is not the only illicit drug produced, consumed and trafficked in Mexico; however due to 
data availability I use only the tons of marihuana seized in each state i at time t.  
55
 The inclusion of the marihuana seizures variable in state i does not qualitatively change the results. These 
estimations are not shown due to space limitations but are available upon request. 
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state to another when controlling for drug enforcement in neighboring states to state i through the 
spatial lag of marihuana seizures. 
Coming now to the control variables and as shown in table 1, the variable for crime reporting 
agencies is positive and significant at the 1% level in the first two specifications and positive and 
significant at the 10% level in the Columns 3 and 4. It could be argued that more crime reporting 
agencies are assigned to those regions with more crime incidents leading to a potential 
endogeneity problem in this variable. However, the distribution of crime reporting agencies 
throughout Mexico is not attached to the incidence of crime in its different regions. There are 
states in Mexico for which the distribution of crime reporting agencies does not correspond to 
the levels of crime activity in those regions. The number of crime reporting agencies assigned to 
regions is more an issue of financial costs (Fondevila 2012). Next, the type of government 
controls do not show any significance and no conclusions from these variables can be drawn. 
Further, I also control for income differences throughout states by including the state per capita 
GDP. Since the impact of the additional controls is not my primary focus, I do not delve further 
into these aspects in the interest of space.  
 
III.4.2 Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check of the previous findings in this section I present the estimations of the 
above-mentioned models using a different weighting matrix in the construction of the spatial 
lags. In line with Buonanno et al. (2011), Bode et al. (2007) and Gumprecht (2005) I model the 
spatial weights as inverse exponential distances as: e
ijDis )(  where ijDis denotes the distance 
between states i and j, and  is a constant distance decay parameter that determines the 
percentage-diffusion-loss per unit of distance. In other words, it accounts for the degree of how 
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strong the drug crimes lose weight with increasing distance. Following Bode et al. (2007), I 
arbitrarily assume three different values for  = 0.005, 0.01 and 0.001. Tables 2, 3 and 4 present 
the results considering this weighting scheme with the three different corresponding values for  . 
First, in all three tables in Column 1 it can be seen that regardless of the value assigned to   
the spatial lag of the drug crime incidents variable remains significant and positive at the 5% and 
10% level. Here I use the same external instrument set as in Table 1. Thus, for all three tables, 
the F statistic and the Hansen J-statistic lend support to the relevance and exogeneity of the 
external instruments in Column 1. Looking now at Table 2, we see that by assigning   the 
intermediate value of 0.005, the F statistics of the spatial lag for the marihuana seizures variable 
in Columns 2 to 4 are less than 10, while the Hansen-J statistic renders support to the three 
specifications. Based on this, in Table 3 I choose the smaller value of 0.01 for  . The results are 
similar to those in Table 2 in terms of the F statistic for the marihuana seizures variable being 
less than 10. Next, in Table 4, I choose the smallest value of the three selected for  , namely 
0.001. We see that all four specifications observe the same behavior as in Table 1, however the 
spatial lag of the marihuana seizures variable now shows no significance. In terms of 
interpretation, Column 1 Table 4 shows that, everything else constant, an increase of one 
standard deviation in drug crime incidents in the neighboring states of state i leads to an increase 
of 34.2% in drug crimes in state i. I obtain this value in a similar way as in Table 1. Furthermore, 
holding all other controls constant, in Columns 3 and 4, an increase of one standard deviation in 
drug crime incidents in the neighboring states of state i lead to an increase of the drug crimes in 
state i by 41% and 42%, respectively.  
As can be seen in Table 4 Column 2, the spatial lag of the marihuana seizures is no longer 
significant. Given the availability of data, this does not necessarily mean that by seizing drugs 
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the authorities do not exert an impact on organized crime and hence on crime derived from 
illegal drug activities. Certainly the literature on the crime-deterrence relationship has found 
mixed results with the contributions of Ehrlich (1975), Witte (1980), Layson (1985), Grogger 
(1991), and Levitt (1997) finding that increases in criminal-justice sanctions reduce criminal 
activity. On the other hand, the papers of Myers (1983), Cover and Thistle (1988) and Cornwell 
and Trumbull (1994) find either a weak relationship, or none at all.  
One reason for the vanishing of significance in the spatial lag of marihuana seizures could be 
the frequency of the data. In the literature on the economics of crime, this has been highlighted 
by Corman and Mocan (2000), who by employing high frequency data, find a strong support for 
the deterrence hypothesis.   
 
III.5 CONCLUSION  
This article investigates whether there is a spillover effect of drug crime across Mexican states or 
whether there is a deterrent effect from drug control policy on drug crimes across Mexican states. 
Building on the historical background of a highly centralized, permissive and protective power 
structure towards organized criminal activities, I initially hypothesize that drug crime in Mexico 
should vary not only with local socio-economic factors but that geographical space also plays an 
important role in this variation. Applying spatial econometrics techniques and accounting for the 
inherent endogeneity in a spatial regression, I find that drug crime incidents show a diffusion 
effect from one region of Mexico to another. This effect is robust to different weighting schemes 
of the weighting matrix used in the computation of the spatial lag variable. I further hypothesized 
that deterrence measures from the authorities in state i could have either a negative or a positive 
impact on the level of drug crime incidents in the neighboring states. 
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It can be the case that DTOs move to neighboring locations as a result of a harsh deterrence 
policy in state i thereby increasing drug crime incidents in the former locations. On the contrary 
it can also be the case that the measures implemented by the authorities in state i inhibit the 
activities of the DTOs in such a way that drug crime incidents in the neighboring states get 
reduced. In practice there is a wide array of deterrence measures from the authorities as 
suggested in the economics of crime literature. For instance, the number of police and military 
forces deployed, effective arrests and stricter sentences for those arrested on drug charges, 
seizures of arms and drugs etc. Given the scarce availability of this kind of data, which would 
allow me to construct a reasonable sub-national panel dataset, I use tons of marihuana seizures as 
a proxy for deterrence, i.e., drug control policy. I find weak evidence for this last expectation; a 
result which is not borne out by the robustness checks of the empirical models. As argued above, 
this does not necessarily mean that deterrence measures from the authorities do not imply a re-
structuration of the DTOs when a leading kingpin gets arrested or big seizures of drugs, weapons 
and money take place. 
This study provides evidence of a diffusion effect of drug crimes from one region in Mexico 
to another. The findings reported here may have implications for our understanding on whether 
drug crime in Mexico spreads from one state to another and whether a drug crime deterrent 
measure in one region coincides with a cost or a benefit for another. In terms of public security 
policy this has implications for a better coordination among the several police forces across 
Mexico. 
Furthermore, the findings presented here may have implications for regions beyond the 
Mexican context experiencing a similar situation and may motivate more detailed data collection 
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on crime statistics. Further research might look at the effects of different drug crime deterrence 
measures by the authorities and at which level of deterrence, if any, a turning point exists. 
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Table III.1: Drug Crimes (1997-2010): 2SLS estimations. 
Weighting Scheme: Inverse Distance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
          
Spatial Lag Drug Crimes 0.00499* 
 
0.00528* 0.00805** 
 
(0.00286) 
 
(0.00305) (0.00388) 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 
 
-0.00169** -4.96e-05 0.000182 
  
(0.000754) (0.000791) (0.000841) 
GDP pc (log) -0.546 0.806 -0.446 -0.602 
 
(0.575) (1.108) (0.831) (0.897) 
Unemployment Rate -0.119 0.0426 -0.116 -0.170* 
 
(0.0966) (0.119) (0.0999) (0.102) 
Population (log) 1.550 -0.835 1.611 2.317 
 
(1.161) (1.243) (1.967) (2.099) 
Crime Reporting Agencies pc (log) 0.255*** 0.354*** 0.255* 0.234* 
 
(0.0987) (0.136) (0.133) (0.139) 
Migration Rate -0.0584 -0.0603 -0.0546 -0.0594 
 
(0.0921) (0.0979) (0.0947) (0.107) 
Marihuana Seizures (log) 
  
0.0332* 0.0450** 
   
(0.0178) (0.0188) 
PRI Governor ruling years -0.0253 -0.0973 -0.0290 -0.00123 
 
(0.258) (0.428) (0.255) (0.278) 
PAN Governor ruling years 0.0435 0.153 0.0453 0.0184 
 
(0.150) (0.311) (0.175) (0.183) 
PRD Governor ruling years -0.161 -0.356 -0.161 -0.0911 
 
(0.186) (0.273) (0.195) (0.226) 
F-statistic (spatial lag Drug Crimes) 52.3 
 
53.12 19.97 
F-statistic (spatial lag Marihuana 
Seizures) 
 
11.3 12.13 12.6 
Hansen J (p-value) 0.1885 0.8798 0.0874 0.8654 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Number of Observations 455 455 453 453 
R-squared 0.545 0.229 0.542 0.500 
Method FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS 
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
Note: Column 3 uses the spatial lags of GDP per capita logged, unemployment rate, population and crime 
reporting agencies. Column 4 uses the spatial lags of unemployment rate, population and crime reporting 
agencies. 
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Table III.2: Drug Crimes (1997-2010): 2SLS estimations  
Weighting Scheme: Exponential Function Inverse Distance (0.005) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
          
Spatial Lag Drug Crimes 6.65e-05** 
 
0.000123 0.000145* 
 
(3.30e-05) 
 
(7.66e-05) (7.56e-05) 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 
 
-3.48e-06 3.87e-06 5.52e-06 
  
(2.14e-06) (5.27e-06) (5.70e-06) 
GDP pc (log) -0.497 -0.468 -0.564 -0.621 
 
(0.542) (0.536) (0.679) (0.722) 
Unemployment Rate -0.116 0.0336 -0.263 -0.325 
 
(0.0844) (0.130) (0.207) (0.234) 
Population (log) 1.715* -0.197 3.558 4.280 
 
(0.904) (1.292) (2.493) (2.719) 
Crime Reporting Agencies pc (log) 0.235*** 0.287*** 0.187* 0.168 
 
(0.0784) (0.106) (0.0993) (0.105) 
Migration Rate -0.0557 -0.0647 -0.0430 -0.0392 
 
(0.0760) (0.0753) (0.0923) (0.102) 
Marihuana Seizures (log) 
  
-0.00681 -0.0235 
   
(0.0545) (0.0601) 
PRI Governor ruling years -0.0571 0.0477 -0.176 -0.224 
 
(0.233) (0.257) (0.292) (0.319) 
PAN Governor ruling years 0.0468 0.120 -0.0243 -0.0534 
 
(0.141) (0.156) (0.184) (0.197) 
PRD Governor ruling years -0.207 -0.242 -0.187 -0.179 
 
(0.154) (0.151) (0.161) (0.163) 
F-statistic (spatial lag Drug Crimes) 28.96   27.36 36.35 
F-statistic (spatial lag Marihuana 
Seizures) 
 
4.17 3.17 4.17 
Hansen J (p-value) 0.5219 0.2017 0.5458 0.7527 
Kleibergen Paap LM test 16.75 8.038 3.784 3.79 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Observations 455 455 453 453 
R-squared 0.659 0.541 0.599 0.522 
Method FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS 
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
Note: Column 3 uses the spatial lags of GDP per capita logged, unemployment rate, population and crime 
reporting agencies. Column 4 uses the spatial lags of unemployment rate, population and crime reporting 
agencies. 
 
 
113 
 
Table III.3: Drug Crimes (1997-2010): 2SLS estimations  
Weighting Scheme: Exponential Function Inverse Distance (0.01) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
          
Spatial Lag Drug Crimes 9.76e-05* 
 
8.20e-05 9.44e-05 
 
(5.49e-05) 
 
(0.000106) (0.000107) 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 
 
-5.20e-06 -1.37e-06 -3.85e-07 
  
(3.36e-06) (4.44e-06) (4.84e-06) 
GDP pc (log) -0.373 -0.641 -0.343 -0.326 
 
(0.512) (0.607) (0.516) (0.525) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0832 0.0607 -0.0438 -0.0700 
 
(0.0910) (0.148) (0.187) (0.199) 
Population (log) 1.606** -0.567 1.202 1.536 
 
(0.739) (1.429) (1.520) (1.657) 
Crime Reporting Agencies pc (log) 0.242*** 0.275** 0.246*** 0.242*** 
 
(0.0696) (0.111) (0.0720) (0.0682) 
Migration Rate -0.0326 -0.0751 -0.0365 -0.0308 
 
(0.0687) (0.0820) (0.0558) (0.0596) 
Marihuana Seizures (log) 
  
0.0422 0.0304 
   
(0.0489) (0.0535) 
PRI Governor ruling years -0.121 0.116 -0.0720 -0.112 
 
(0.211) (0.271) (0.267) (0.287) 
PAN Governor ruling years 0.0141 0.142 0.0384 0.0182 
 
(0.127) (0.162) (0.154) (0.160) 
PRD Governor ruling years -0.258* -0.222 -0.248* -0.255* 
 
(0.131) (0.161) (0.135) (0.137) 
F-statistic (spatial lag Drug Crimes) 10.96   10.38 10.31 
F-statistic (spatial lag Marihuana 
Seizures) 
 
1.82 2.2 2.8 
Hansen J (p-value) 0.8282 0.7534 0.7342 0.577 
Kleibergen Paap LM test 12.06 5.012 9.02 5.002 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Observations 455 455 453 453 
R-squared 0.695 0.478 0.684 0.695 
Method FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS 
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
Note: Column 3 uses the spatial lags of GDP per capita logged, unemployment rate, population and crime 
reporting agencies. Column 4 uses the spatial lags of unemployment rate, population and crime reporting 
agencies. 
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Table III.4: Drug Crimes (1997-2010): 2SLS estimations  
Weighting Scheme: Exponential Function Inverse Distance (0.001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
Drug Crimes 
(log) 
          
Spatial Lag Drug Crimes 2.68e-05* 
 
3.13e-05** 3.19e-05** 
 
(1.52e-05) 
 
(1.54e-05) (1.58e-05) 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 
 
-1.44e-06 8.06e-07 8.27e-07 
  
(1.56e-06) (1.13e-06) (1.13e-06) 
GDP pc (log) -0.690 -0.307 -0.816 -0.822 
 
(0.600) (0.560) (0.669) (0.674) 
Unemployment Rate -0.101 0.0541 -0.160 -0.163 
 
(0.0922) (0.165) (0.122) (0.122) 
Population (log) 1.957 -0.291 2.759 2.802 
 
(1.282) (1.752) (1.853) (1.859) 
Crime Reporting Agencies pc  (log) 0.257*** 0.289*** 0.243** 0.243** 
 
(0.0939) (0.108) (0.101) (0.101) 
Migration Rate -0.0537 -0.0573 -0.0436 -0.0436 
 
(0.0874) (0.0792) (0.0973) (0.0977) 
Marihuana Seizures (log) 
  
0.0224 0.0225 
   
(0.0174) (0.0174) 
PRI Governor ruling years -0.0652 0.0219 -0.121 -0.122 
 
(0.223) (0.285) (0.262) (0.262) 
PAN Governor ruling years 0.0485 0.132 0.0106 0.00916 
 
(0.137) (0.180) (0.164) (0.165) 
PRD Governor ruling years -0.210 -0.268* -0.202 -0.201 
 
(0.155) (0.144) (0.155) (0.156) 
F-statistic (spatial lag Drug Crimes) 84.57   102.31 131.26 
F-statistic (spatial lag Marihuana 
Seizures) 
 
27.18 13.57 13.16 
Hansen J (p-value) 0.2257 0.0535 0.4067 0.2007 
Kleibergen Paap LM test 84.567 27.181 12.749 11.875 
Time specific dummies YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of States 32 33 34 35 
Observations 455 455 453 453 
R-squared 0.599 0.560 0.588 0.588 
Method FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS FE-2SLS 
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
Note: Column 3 uses the spatial lags of GDP per capita logged, unemployment rate, population and crime 
reporting agencies. Column 4 uses the spatial lags of unemployment rate, population and crime reporting 
agencies. 
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Appendix III.1: Mexican States 
 
Aguascalientes Distrito Federal Morelos Sinaloa 
Baja California Durango Nayarit Sonora 
Baja California Sur Estado de México Nuevo León Tabasco 
Campeche Guanajuato Oaxaca Tamaulipas 
Chiapas Guerrero Puebla Tlaxcala 
Chihuahua Hidalgo Querétaro  Veracruz 
Coahuila Jalisco Quintana Roo Yucatán 
Colima Michoacán San Luis Potosí Zacatecas 
 
 
 
 
Appendix III.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Drug Crime Incidents (log) 6.353096 1.118547 2.99573 9.88262 456 
GDP pc (log) 9.038824 .6807205 7.75593 11.9643 672 
Unemployment Rate 2.485603 1.166651 .735916   6.60365 672 
Population (log) 14.61702 .7967536    12.6691 16.5368 672 
Crime Reporting Agencies pc (log) -5.845844 .6100128 -8.37109 -4.51869 541 
Migration Rate 3.385281 2.306138 .56069 15.8146 672 
PRI state ruling years .7127976 .4527938 0 1 672 
PAN state ruling years .1845238 .3881997 0 1 672 
PRD state ruling years .1175595 .3223257 0 1 672 
Tons of Marihuana Seizures (log) 8.4711   3.02253 -3.506558 13.44835 542 
Spatial Lag Drug Crime Incidents 48.16873 51.14232 .0461443 242.2251 512 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 1749.082 875.2641 180.8141 4020.006 512 
Spatial Lag Unemployment Rate .1284549 .0834982 .0093864 .4506391 672 
Spatial Lag Population 174006.4 101571.6 20663.55 462146 672 
Spatial Lag Crime Rep. Agencies pc  .0001542 .0000688 .0000153 .0003237 544 
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Appendix III.3: Descriptive Statistics of Spatial Lags for Robustness Checks 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
ROBUSTNESS of TABLE 2      
Spatial Lag Drug Crime Incidents 2979.87   3729.946 6.60e-07 24744.72 544 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 96786.33 106357.5 330.3813 744577.1 544 
Spatial Lag Unemployment Rate 7.605879 5.563206 .0401859 28.01068 672 
Spatial Lag Population 1.07e+07 8356705 64059.5 3.27e+07 672 
Spatial Lag Crime Rep. Agencies pc  .0092507 .0043306 9.37e-06 .0207834 544 
      
ROBUSTNESS of TABLE 3      
Spatial Lag Drug Crime Incidents 1572.538 2337.871 1.83e-15 20738.42 544 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 57921.23 97802.42 .6165496 695796.6 544 
Spatial Lag Unemployment Rate 3.985855 2.725504 .0011553 15.62765 672 
Spatial Lag Population 5538695 4911314 1789.706 2.26e+07 672 
Spatial Lag Crime Rep. Agencies pc  .0049928 .0022659 1.10e-08 .0119154 544 
      
ROBUSTNESS of TABLE 4      
Spatial Lag Drug Crime Incidents 12793.83 11306.89 4.625066 47877.76 544 
Spatial Lag Marihuana Seizures 569167.3 293635.7 44457.74 1376893 544 
Spatial Lag Unemployment Rate 33.39079 17.62321 1.791199 82.98112 672 
Spatial Lag Population 4.38e+07 1.64e+07 2211108 7.25e+07 672 
Spatial Lag Crime Rep. Agencies pc  .0425417 .0143317 .0073515 .0680854 544 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
 
 
 
Appendix III.4: Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables Definitions and data sources 
Drug Crime Incidents (log) 
Measure which includes drug related crimes in state i at time t. (Production, Selling, 
Transportation and Trafficking of illicit drugs). The data are provided by INEGI. 
Unemployment Rate 
Rate of unemployed people in state i at time t. The data are from the population census 
data and the population counting, both provided by INEGI. 
Crime Reporting Agencies  
Number of Crime Reporting Agencies per capita in state i at time t. The data are from 
the Judiciary System Statistics provided by INEGI. 
Migration Rate 
Rate of people migrating from one state to another. The data are from the population 
census data and the population counting, both provided by INEGI. 
PRI state ruling years 
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the state governor was from the political 
party PRI. The data on the exact date on which a governor was ruling in each state 
are obtained from the state elections results and information published by Institute of 
Marketing and Opinion (IMO) in Jalisco, Mexico. 
PAN state ruling years 
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the state governor was from the political 
party PAN. The data on the exact date on which a governor was ruling in each state 
are obtained from the state elections results and information published by Institute of 
Marketing and Opinion (IMO) in Jalisco, Mexico. 
PRD state ruling years 
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the state governor was from the political 
party PRD. The data on the exact date on which a governor was ruling in each state 
are obtained from the state elections results and information published by Institute of 
Marketing and Opinion (IMO) in Jalisco, Mexico. 
State per Capita GDP (log)  
Own calculation using data on each State GDP and Population in each State. Values are 
in Mexican pesos, constant prices 2003. The data on State GDP are form the National 
Accounting System and the Population data are from the population censuses 1990, 
2000, 2010 and population counting 1995, 2005. All data are provided by INEGI. 
Tons of Marihuana 
Seizures (log) 
Tons of Marihuana seized by the Mexican authorities in state i at time t. The data are 
from the Office of the General Prosecutor Attorney General.  
Spatial Lag Drug Crime 
Incidents 
Variable which registers the drug crimes in states j-i at time t. This measure was 
calculated implementing an inverse distance weighting matrix without row 
standardization. 
Spatial Lag Marihuana 
Seizures 
Variable which registers the tons of marihuana seized in states j-i at time t. This measure 
was calculated implementing an inverse distance weighting matrix without row 
standardization. 
Spatial Lag Unemployment 
Rate 
Variable which registers the unemployment rate in states j-i at time t. This measure was 
calculated implementing an inverse distance weighting matrix without row 
standardization. 
Spatial Lag Population 
Variable which registers the population in states j-i at time t. This measure was 
calculated implementing an inverse distance weighting matrix without row 
standardization. 
Spatial Lag Crime Rep. 
Agencies pc 
Variable which registers the crime reporting agencies in states j-i at time t. This measure 
was calculated implementing an inverse distance weighting matrix without row 
standardization. 
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